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I. ADOPTION OF THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
1. HOFFMAN V. JONES
On July 10, 1973, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Hoffman v.
Jones' and instituted the doctrine of comparative negligence in Florida.
1. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), aff'g 272 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973) [hereinafter
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In drastically altering its law with respect to negligence actions,2 Florida
joined an ever-growing majority of jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine.
Although twenty-seven jurisdictions have adopted comparative neg-
ligence,3 Florida's judicial adoption differs markedly from that of a major-
ity of other states in two respects: first, most states have adopted the
doctrine by statute;' second, and of equal importance, by adopting a
"pure form" of comparative negligence,5 Florida has joined a very small
minority of states which permit recovery of damages by a tortfeasor who
himself may have been more than fifty percent responsible for his own
injuries. In view of the incompleteness of this judicial creation, and in
light of the relative uniqueness of the pure form of comparative negli-
gence, the decision in Hoffman v. Jones provides and will continue to pro-
vide some critical repercussions for the judiciary, for the trial bar, .and,
hopefully, for the legislature.'
2. ROLES TO BE PLAYED
Obviously, the primary concern of members of the Florida judiciary
relating to comparative negligence will center on the administration of
the doctrine. This will doubtless be no small task since for all its seeming
simplicity in requiring that damages be distributed according to the rela-
tive fault of the parties, comparative negligence has proven extremely
difficult to administer. 7
The advocate, of course, will assist the courts in the implementation
of the doctrine, even as he researches and argues on behalf of his clients
while attempting to fit this "new" concept of loss distribution into his
daily practice. His contribution, like that of the judge, will be in the slow
formulation of practical ways to implement comparative negligence in
specific cases.
referred to as Hoffman]. For a detailed treatment of this case, see 28 U. MIAmi L. REv. 473
(1974).
2. 280 So. 2d at 438. Although a literal reading of the holding of Hoffman would require
that the case be limited to negligence actions, the probable intent of the supreme court was
to subject all actions wherein contributory negligence is a defense to the apportionment rule.
Id. See section II, C, 5 infra.
3. See note 19 infra.
4. Id. The widespread effects of the doctrine of comparative negligence on other laws
make legislative action in that area desirable. The Florida legislature, as will be pointed
out in section III, A infra, could make the transition to the doctrine much swifter and less
painful.
5. 280 So. 2d at 439. See also note 19 infra and accompanying text.
6. The question of the supreme court's authority to adopt comparative negligence by
case decision is obviously moot. Assuming, however, that the court has the authority, and
the writers of this article think they do, it is submitted that many problems and a great deal
of uncertainty could have been avoided had the legislature acted first. Nevertheless, it is not
too late for the legislature to act. The complete adoption of comparative negligence in
Florida must be a joint effort, and even though traditionally the legislature enacts statutes
which the courts merely construe, there is no reason why the procedure cannot be reversed-
insofar as it already has been by the Hoffman court-just this once.
7. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Micn. L. REV. 465 (1953). FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.180
(third party practice) should be reevaluated. See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding the efforts of the judge and the advocate, there is
a need for some additional teleological guidance to the evolutionary
process begun by Hoffman. While the judge and the advocate have been
cast in their roles by the mere announcement of the doctrine, there is
one performer yet to be committed-one who could truly make the differ-
ence in whether this will be a superb production or just another play-
the legislator.8 If left to the judiciary and the bar, the resolution of such
unanswered questions as the effect of the doctrine on contribution among
joint tortfeasors,9 on assumption of risk,"0 and on the role of the insurance
company," will be found only by the tedious, often confusing evolution
of the common law. It is submitted in this article that the play needs a
director, and that the directorial function can best be performed by a
legislature willing to enact comprehensive legislation on the subject.' 2
3. FORMAT OF THIS ARTICLE
Neither this article nor any other can provide an exhaustive coverage
of the subject of comparative negligence. Already, there exists a plethora
of books and articles on the subject, treating everything from its history
to practical problems in other jurisdictions.'" However, the pure form
of comparative negligence, by virtue of its rarity, has undergone far less
examination than have others. 4 Therefore, the three-fold purpose of the
8. The authors of this article were somewhat skeptical of the pure form rule at first.
However, a rigorous comparison of all of the forms suggests that the pure form rule
should be retained. It is with respect to the refinements to this form that the legislature is
herein petitioned to take action. See Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177
N.W.2d 513 (1970).
9. See section III, A, 4 infra.
10. It is the opinion of the writers that in the case of assumption of risk, the need for
piecemeal, empirical study can better be satisfied by the "tedious, often confusing evolution
of the common law." See section II, C, 6 infra.
11. See section III, B infra.
12. This is not to say that the promulgation of rules of procedure by the Supreme Court
of Florida could not also perform some of the same functions, but it appears from the
language in Hoffman that court has declined to act at this time.
13. A non-exhaustive but representative sample includes: C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (19.71) [hereinafter cited as HEFT & HEFT]; W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER] ; Dobbs, Act 191: Comparative
Negligence, 9 ARK. L. REV. 357 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Dobbs]; Fisher & Wax, Com-
parative Negligence-Some Unanswered Questions, 47 FLA. B.J. 566 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Fisher & Wax]; Ghiardi & Hogan, Comparative Negligence-The Wisconsin Rule and
Procedure, 18 DEF. L.J. 537 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ghiardi & Hogan]; Gregory, Loss
Distribution by Comparative Negligence, 21 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1936) ; [hereinafter cited as
Gregory]; Leflar, Walker & Bethell, Panel on Comparative Negligence-Third Party Practice,
10 ARK. L. REV. 88 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Leflar, Walker & Bethell]; Leflar & Wolfe,
Panel on Comparative Negligence and Liability Insurance, 11 ARK. L. REV. 71 (1957) [here-
inafter cited as Leflar & Wolfe] ; Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence:
A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Maloney];
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953) ; Schwartz, Pure Comparative
Negligence in Action, 34 AM. T. LAWYERS J. 117 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz];
Editorial Annot., Comparative Negligence Cases, 18 DEF. L.J. 571 (1969) ; Annot., 32
A.L.R.3d 463 (1970).
14. In the fall of 1955, shortly after Arkansas enacted its first comparative negligence
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writers will be to provide first some basic background information and
resource material for the reader, second an analysis of areas of practice
that will be affected by the doctrine, 15 and then a suggestion to the courts,
the bar, and the legislature of possible approaches to solving the problems
that are expected to arise in the implementation of the new apportionment
rule. In short, the object is to make a contribution to the work of both
the practitioner, who must practice under the doctrine as announced in
Hoffman, and to the judiciary and the legislature, who share the power
to shape the course of comparative negligence in this state and thereby to
help Florida avoid some of the pitfalls pointed out by the past experiences
of others.
B. The Florida Supreme Court Decision in Hoffman
1. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Hoffman v. Jones was a wrongful death action in which the trial
court refused to give proposed jury instructions on comparative negli-
gence. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed, adopted
the comparative negligence rule and certified the question to the Florida
Supreme Court as one of great public interest. 6
statute, Dan Byron Dobbs wrote an excellent article concerning the potential effects of the
statute (a pure form rule) on Arkansas law. See Dobbs, supra note 13. Shortly after this
article was written the Arkansas legislature revised the statute, changing it to a modified
form of comparative negligence. See note 19 infra. See also Rosenberg, Comparative Negli-
gence-A Survey of the Arkansas Experience, 22 ARK. L. REv. 692 (1969).
15. Some of the areas not covered herein include:
(1) Res ipsa loquitur. See Turk v. H. C. Prange Co., 18 Wis. 2d 547, 119 N.W.2d
365 (1963) ; Ghiardi & Hogan, supra note 13, at 554-55.
(2) Negligence of infants. See Ghiardi & Hogan at 555; Editorial Annot., Compara-
tive Negligence Cases, 18 DEF. L.J. 571, 583-84 (1969).
(3) Nuisance. Ghiardi & Hogan at 556, Editorial Annot., supra at 588.
(4) Attractive Nuisance. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 386-87.
16. Jones v. Hoffman, 272 So. 2d 529, 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973) ("Whether or not the
Court should replace the contributory negligence rule with the principles of comparative
negligence?").
The supreme court's decision consisted of three phases. First, the court chastised the
district court for exceeding its authority by attempting to overrule a long line of precedents
(including supreme court decisions) which established the contributory negligence rule in
Florida. 280 So. 2d at 434, 440. See also Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974), rev'g
Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). It should be noted that ever since
the leading case of Louisville & N.R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886), an unbroken line
of cases had recognized and implemented the contributory negligence rule in Florida. How-
ever, even in Yniestra, Chief Justice McWhorter castigated the contributory negligence rule
for being "unjust and inequitable." 280 So. 2d at 437; Maloney, supra note 13, at 157-58.
Secondly, the court examined its own authority to judicially adopt the comparative
negligence doctrine. After weighing the competing arguments, the majority decided that
since the doctrine of contributory negligence was "judicially created," it could also be
judicially modified or abolished; and, furthermore, in response to the inactivity of the legis-
lature in this area, it determined that where "great social upheaval dictates," it could change
the rule regardless of the nature of its inception. 280 So. 2d at 437. See Symposium, Com-
ments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or the
Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1968). Compare Maki v. Frelk, 40 I11. 2d 193,
239 N.E.2d 445 (1968), with Maki v. Frelk, 85 Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967), and
Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S.W.2d 869 (1919).
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2. RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING THE DOCTRINE
On the merits, the court carefully considered the several reasons for
adopting comparative negligence. First, the court pointed out that other
jurisdictions were already using the doctrine, including most foreign
countries,17 the federal governments in certain areas"s and several states. 9
17. 280 So. 2d at 436. England and most of the British Commonwealth, Austria, Canada,
China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Switzerland, Thailand,
and Turkey apply the doctrine. See Maloney, supra note 13, at 154.
18. Federal Employers Liability Act (F.E.L.A.), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970) ; Merchant Marine
Act (Jones Act), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) (adopting the F.E.L.A. provisions by reference);
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1970) ; the general common law admiralty
rule is articulated in The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
19. 280 So. 2d at 436. As of this writing twenty-five states and Puerto Rico have "gen-
eral" comparative negligence laws, and more significantly, the rate at which states are adopt-
ing comparative negligence laws is accelerating. It should be noted that most states have had
limited comparative negligence statutes for years. These statutes are usually limited to the
subjects of labor and railroads. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 769.03 (1971) ; Fla. Laws 1887, ch. 3744,
codified in FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1971), which was held unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds in Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Seven-up Bott. Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
Of the twenty-six jurisdictions, twenty-two have comparative negligence statutes of
general application: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 65 (Supp. 1974), formerly No. 296
[1957] Ark. Acts 874 (modified-49% form), formerly No. 191, [1955] Ark. Acts 443 (pure
form); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (Supp. 1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp.
1972); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-801 to 06 (Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156
(Supp. 1974) ; MASS. LAWS 1973, ch. 1123, formerly MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85
(Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (Supp. 1973); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972);
NEB. RaV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1973); N.J.
Laws 1973, ch. 146, creating N.J. STAT. AN. §§ 2A:15-5.1-.3; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§§ 11-12 (Supp. 1973); ORE. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (Supp. 1973); PUERTO Rico LAWS ANN.
tit. 13, § 5141 (Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1972); S.D. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 25.1151 (1967) ; Laws of Texas, 1973, ch. 73-28, creating, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 1,2 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37-43 (Supp. 1973) ; VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973) ; Wash. Laws 1973, ch. 73-138 (effective, April 1, 1974);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1974), amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1966)
(abolishing the modified-49% rule and adopting the modified-50% rule) ; Wvo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-7.2 (Supp. 1973).
The Connecticut statute is limited to negligence actions arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a private motor vehicle. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 38-324 (Supp. 1973).
Three states have non-statutory comparative negligence laws:
FLORIDA: Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). The Florida legislature in
1943, approved a general comparative negligence statute, but failed to override the
governor's veto thereof. Fla. S. Jour., Reg Sess. 1943, at 716-17.
NEW YORK: Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1973) ; Stein v. Whitehead, 40 App. Div. 89, 337 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1973) ; Dixon
v. Knickerbocker Drivurself, Inc., 341 N.Y.S.2d 150 (Albany City Ct. 1973) (stating
that it remains for the Court of Appeals to decide which form of comparative
negligence is to be applied). The status of the rule itself in New York is unclear.
There is a difference of opinion among New York trial courts on whether the Dow
Chemical case actually did adopt comparative negligence. See Fisher & Wax, supra
note 13, at 572 n.9.
TENNESSEE: Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S.W. 869 (1919); Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Cheatham, 118 Tenn. 160, 100 S.W. 902 (1906).
The precise origin of the Georgia law is disputed. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 94-703, 105-603
(1968); Barnett v. Whatley, 87 Ga. App. 860, 75 S.E.2d 667 (1953) ; Smith v. American
Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S.E.2d 90 (1948) ; Section 94-703 is by its terms applicable only
to railroad-connected accidents. Section 105-603 is poorly drafted. It contains elements of a
last clear chance rule and elements of a comparative negligence rule. One group of authori-
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Secondly, it was noted that contributory negligence could no longer be
justified on the grounds that it provided industry and transportation with
a necessary subsidy. The third, and in the court's opinion, the best
reason, was that comparative negligence was simply a more equitable
and socially desirable system of loss distribution.20 The most compelling
jurisprudential reason, however, was that the new rule would bring the
law into closer harmony with the basic attitudes and expectations of the
people. The court stated that it had long been recognized that juries often
compromise verdicts; that is, juries tend to bring in lower verdicts when
they believe a plaintiff to be contributorily negligent, rather than bar his
recovery altogether. 21 This has been true despite jury instructions to the
contrary,22 and one court has even given compromise verdicts judicial
approval. 2 Thus, in adopting the comparative negligence doctrine, the
Supreme Court of Florida has merely made it possible for the jury to
take into consideration the plaintiff's causal negligence overtly, without
having to ignore the court's instructions. Furthermore, of course, it has
encouraged those juries that obey jury instructions to travel, lawfully,
a more equitable course in apportioning damages.
3. CHOICE OF THE PURE FORM
Once having decided to adopt a rule of comparative negligence, the
court had a difficult choice to make concerning which form to adopt.
Out of five possible variations, the court chose the pure form but de-
clined to detail the reasons for its choice, other than to state that the
pure form was the most equitable method of allocating damages in neg-
ligence actions.24 Of the five forms, the pure form, as its name implies,
ties believe that the Georgia courts, through a "tour de force of construction", expanded
the limited railroad statute into a general comparative negligence rule. See PsossER, supra
note 13, § 67, at 436 & n.79; Maloney, supra note 13, at 157. Other writers are of the opinion
that section 105-603 is a general comparative negligence statute. See HET & HKr, supra note
13, § 3.170; Dobbs, supra note 13, at 358 n.4. The editorial annotation following section 105-
603 states that the statute has two rules incorporated therein-a last clear chance rule and a
general comparative negligence rule. Wynne v. Southern Bell. Tel & Tel., 159 Ga. 623, 126
S.E. 388 (1925).
20. 280 So. 2d at 437. Accord, Gregory, supra note 13; Rosenberg, Comparative Negli-
gence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13 ARK. L. Rav. 89 (1959). But see Gil-
more, Comparative Negligence from the Viewpoint of Casualty Insurance, 10 ARx. L. Rsv.
82 (1956).
21. "(T)here is something basically wrong with a rule of law that is so contrary to
the settled convictions of the lay community that laymen will almost always refuse to en-
force it, even when solemnly told to do so by a judge whose instructions they have sworn to
follow." 280 So. 2d at 437, quoting Maloney, supra note 13, at 151-52.
22. Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938). "We
but blind our eyes to obvious reality to the extent that we ignore the fact that in many
cases juries apply [comparative negligence] in spite of us."
23. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 234-35, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955) (wherein the
court referred to compromise verdicts as "the time-honored right of a jury.").
24. Comparative negligence has been defined as "a system of apportioning damages be-
tween mutually negligent parties according to their proportionate share of causal fault,
thereby diminishing rather than precluding a negligent plaintiff's recovery." Note, 17 Bu=.
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represents the greatest attempt to implement totally the policy behind
comparative negligence, i.e., to apportion liability strictly according to the
proportionate fault of the parties. Under this form, one may recover some-
thing regardless of his degree of negligence as long as his negligence is
not the sole cause of his injury. Furthermore, since there is no artificial
limit placed on the operation of the rule (as in such other forms as those
which bar recovery by parties having negligence equal to or greater than
that of their adversaries25 or by parties having negligence greater than
the one from whom recovery is sought, 2 or those barring recovery by
one more than "slightly" negligent 27), both the claimant and counter-
claimant have hope of recovery. Only a few jurisdictions have adopted
such a plan,28 and the commentators have varied in their reactions toward
the thought of letting one who may be guilty of the greater negligence
enjoy a recovery simply because he also had the greater damages.29
L. REv. 573 (1968). There are however, divergent viewpoints on just how the system should
be implemented and five forms of comparative negligence are presently in operation through-
out the country: the pure form; the modified-49% form; the modified-50% form; the slight
versus gross form; and the remote contributory negligence form. See Maki v. Frelk, 85 M.
App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284, rev'd, 40 Il. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1967).
25. The modified-49% form is by far the most popular. Under it, one can recover dam-
ages diminished by his degree of negligence so long as his negligence is less than that of
the adversary or adversaries from whom he seeks recovery. Those states having the modi-
fied-49% form are: Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming. See note 19 supra. As stated before, if one's negli-
gence is equal to that of his adversary he may not recover under this form. The modified-49%
rule seems to be an unjustified compromise, possibly reflecting the legislative and political
process. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 465 (1953). See note 96 infra.
26. This type is known as the modified-50% form. It permits an injured party to re-
cover damages so long as his fault is not greater than that of his opponent. Those states
having the modified-50% form are: Connecticut, New Hampshire, Texas, Vermont and
Wisconsin. See note 19 supra. For several years Wisconsin had been the leading modified-49%
state, but in 1971 (as a result of great pressure from the judiciary to adopt the pure form)
its legislature adopted the 50% form. Id.; Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120,
177 N.W.2d 513 (1970).
27. Nebraska and South Dakota have a slight-gross rule wherein one whose negligence
is "slight" as compared to that of another whose negligence is "gross" may recover diminished
damages. In addition, Tennessee has a rare form known as "remote contributory negligence."
Finally, there is still in effect in the United States the antiquated admiralty rule, applied
when property damage is caused by the collision of two ships so that damages are divided
equally without regard to comparative degrees of fault. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
28. Florida, Mississippi, New York (possibly), Rhode Island, Washington, Puerto Rico.
The federal government has adopted this plan in certain areas, such as those covered by the
Federal Employers Liability Act, the Jones Act, and the Death on the High Seas Act. See
note 19 supra.
29. For an example of the computation process, see notes 38 & 39 infra and accompany-
ing text.
As to the reaction of commentators to "pure" comparative negligence, a non-exhaustive
list of those who favor and those who oppose it follows. IN FAVOR: Vincent v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970); PROSSER, supra note 13, § 67; Krause,
No-Fault's Alternative-The Case for Comparative Negligence and Compulsory Arbitration
in New York, 44 N.Y. STATE B.J. 535 (1972); Schwartz, supra note 13; AGAINST: HEFr &
HEFT, supra note 13, § 1.50; Gilmore, Comparative Negligence From the Viewpoint of Casu-
alty Insurance, 10 ARK. L. Rav. 82 (1956). One argument against the pure form is that in
some cases one who is less responsible for the accident will ultimately be required to compen-
sate the more responsible party. For instance, depending on the damages sustained, one who
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4. OPERATION OF THE PURE FORM RULE
The pure form rule set out by the Hoffman court is simply stated,
but not so simply administered. The court, however, did attempt to set
out in the case the procedure for adminstering the doctrine,3 0 to designate
when it was to be applied and to denote the division of functions between
the judge and the jury.
If the defendant is not negligent, or if the defendant's negligence is
not a legal cause of the damage or injury, or if the plaintiff's own negli-
gence (or that which is imputed to him) is the sole proximate cause of
his injury,8 ' then the plaintiff is barred from any recovery. If, however,
both the plaintiff and defendant (or defendants) are negligent and the
negligence of both is a legal cause 2 of the injury or damage, then the
plaintiff may recover diminished damages.3
is 99% negligent may recover from one who is only 1% negligent and this is said to be un-just. However, in practice many courts have closely scrutinized verdicts wherein one party's
negligence has been particularly great vis-&-vis the other party, and have either found that the
negligence of the first was the sole proximate cause of his injury, or that a remittitur should
issue. Lowry v. Seabord Airline R.R., 171 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1948); Florida E.C.R.R. v.
Townsend, 104 Fla. 362, 140 So. 196, modified on other grounds, 104 Fla. 362, 143 So. 445
(1932); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Padgett, 71 Fla. 90, 70 So. 998 (1916); Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v.
Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 So. 835 (1917).
Another example is one in which the plaintiff's negligence is 25% and defendant's negli-
gence is 75%, but the plaintiff sustains only $1,000 damages whereas defendant sustains
$10,000 damages. Defendant, 75% negligent, will owe plaintiff 75% times 1,000 or $750 and
plaintiff, 25o at fault, will owe defendant 25% times 10,000 or $2,500, leaving defendant with
a net recovery of $1,750. The Hoffman court responded to this seeming inequity by stating
that "liability . . .in such a case should not depend on what damages (one) suffered, but
upon which damages he caused." 280 So. 2d at 439 (emphasis in original).
30. 280 So. 2d at 438-39.
31. Lowry v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 171 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1948); Seaboard Air Line
R.R. v. Watson, 94 Fla. 571, 113 So. 716 (1927); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Padgett, 71 Fla. 90,
70 So. 998 (1916). See section II, A infra.
32. The Hoffman court made it very clear that only causal negligence is to be appor-
tioned under the rule, and that any negligence which is not a proximate contributing cause
of the accident should be disregarded by the jury. In Florida Cent. & Pac. R.R. v. Williams,
37 Fla. 406, 20 So. 558 (1896), it was held to be error for the court's charge on comparative
negligence to omit that the jury should not take into account the negligence of either party
that did not proximately contribute to the accident. Accord, Stevenson v. Robinson, 37 So.
2d 568 (Miss. 1948).
Other authorities have taken varying approaches. Prosser would subject the degree of
"culpability" rather than of causality to the apportionment rule. Prosser, Comparative Negli-
gence, 51 MIcH. L. RPv. 465, 481 (1953). Dobbs took the intermediate position, contending
that the degree of culpability was to be apportioned once all the negligence in question bad
been determined to be causal. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 360-61. The Supreme Court of Wis-
consin, in Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d 211, 108 N.W.2d 581 (1961), refused to consider the
distinction between causal negligence and culpability and left the problem "to the common
sense of juries."
33. It is submitted that the Wisconsin approach in Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d 211,
108 N.W.2d 581 (1961) in all probability reflects the wisdom of those who lived with the
doctrine. The question of how to live with varying degrees of negligence was the subject
of Horn v. Snow White Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 240 Wis. 312, 3 N.W.2d 380 (1942),
wherein it was held that a jury, which found three instances where the defendant was
causally negligent and one instance where the plaintiff was causally negligent, need not ap-
portion the negligence on a three to one ratio. See Kraskey v. Johnson, 266 Wis. 201, 63
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The jury in assessing damages would in that event award to the
plaintiff such damages as in the jury's judgment the negligence
of the defendant caused the plaintiff. In other words, the jury
should apportion the negligence of the plaintiff and the negli-
gence of the defendant; then, in reaching the amount due the
plaintiff, the jury should give the plaintiff only such an amount
proportional with his negligence and the negligence of the de-
fendant. .... 84
If plaintiff and defendant are both at fault, the former may
recover, but the amount of his recovery may be only such
proportion of the entire damages plaintiff sustained as the defen-
dant's negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the
plaintiff and defendant 5
Under the rule just stated, if the plaintiff were found to have been 10%
at fault and his total damages were assessed to be $1000 then he would
recover $900 ($1000 X 90%) since the defendant's negligence would
then be 90% of the total negligence in a two-party situation.
It should be noted that the rule, as stated, is one dimensional in
nature. Since in most accidents both parties, or several parties, may re-
ceive injuries, and since it is likely that in most cases more than one party
is at least partially at fault, the one dimensional rule must be applied
first to the plaintiff's claim and then to a defendant's counterclaim. Under
the old contributory negligence rule, of course, theoretically neither neg-
ligent party could recover. Under comparative negligence, however, both
may recover, and in most, if not all cases, a counterclaim will be filed.36
Thus, two verdicts will be brought in by the jury, one for the plaintiff
and one for the defendant on his counterclaim.
N.W.2d 112 (1954) (discussing how to handle the apportionment of varying types of neg-
ligence) ; HEr & HEFT, supra note 13, § 1.240 (active versus passive negligence) ; Schwartz,
supra note 13, at 125, 128; Editorial Annot., Comparative Negligence Cases, 18 DEF. L.J.
571, 576, 578 (1969).
34. 280 So. 2d at 438. The actual mechanics of apportionment has created little trouble.
Although two early cases have contended that the plaintiff's negligence should be compared
to that of the defendant (where plaintiff is 25% at fault and defendant is 75%, the appor-
tionment would be 1 to 3 and plaintiff would recover 2/3 of his damages, defendant 1/3 of
his), the more recently accepted method of apportionment is to compare the plaintiff's
negligence to the total negligence (plaintiff 25% at fault would recover 3/4 rather than 2/3
of his damages and defendant 75% at fault would recover 1/4 not 1/3, on his counterclaim).
See Dobbs, supra note 13, at 359-60. The latter method is probably the most "pure" and is
the accepted method, but the direct comparison method may prove useful in multi-party
actions where one party is either insolvent or unavailable for service. See section III, A, 3, d
infra.
35. 280 So. 2d at 438 (emphasis added). Note that the quoted portion is an almost
verbatim rendition of Florida's railroad statute. See section II, A, 1 infra.
36. FA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a):
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, provided it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction....
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In such event the Court should enter one judgment in favor of
the party receiving the larger verdict, the amount of which
should be the difference between the two verdicts. . . . The
Court's primary responsibility is to enter a judgment which
reflects the true intent of the jury, as expressed in its verdict
or verdicts. 7
For example: ' If plaintiff were 20% negligent and sustained $20,000
damages, and if the defendant were 80% negligent and also sustained
$20,000 damages, there would be a net $12,000 recovery for plaintiff.
Defendant would owe plaintiff 80% of $20,000 or $16,000. Plaintiff
would owe defendant 20% of $20,000 or $4,000. The court, upon receiv-
ing the two verdicts, must set-off the two verdicts and enter a net judg-
ment for the plaintiff of $16,000 less $4,000 or $12,000. Of course if
more parties are added, the computation becomes infinitely more complex,
and so the chances of pre-trial settlement greatly increase."'
According to the literal wording of Hoffman then, the jury has a duty
to determine the percentage of negligence of each party, to determine the
total damages sustained by each party, and to return two verdicts reflect-
ing its findings and computations. It is up to the court to set-off the two
verdicts and to enter a judgment in accordance therewith.40 The Hoffman
court, in emphasizing these functions, was alert to the myriad problems
37. 280 So. 2d at 439 (emphasis added). The court authorized trial judges to require
the jury to return special verdicts. See section III, A, 5 infra.
38. See also, Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MzcH. L. Rxv. 465 (1953), and
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 122-25 for other examples.
39. Actually, the decision in Hoffman is woefully deficient in its failure to prescribe
what is to happen in multiple party cases. For examples of computation by jury and judge
in multi-party situations and the authors' analyses thereof, see section III, A, 4 infra.
40. See Martin v. Makris, 101 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958). Under Maine's original
comparative negligence statute, the jury, via special verdict, was required to determine each
party's total damages and the extent to which those damages should be reduced because of
fault. ME. REv. STAT. As. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1973).
In practice, some judges would permit the jury to find total damages and the relative
degrees of negligence, but reserve to themselves the duty to compute the reduction. This
practice leads to what was called the "double reduction phenomenon"--where the jury would
consciously or unconsciously reduce the amount of recovery without regard to proportionate
negligence. Thereafter the judge would reduce the amount again according to the percent
of negligence returned in the special verdict. In order to solve this problem, the Maine statute
was amended to require the jury to return two dollar amounts, reflecting total damages
and final net recovery, and to ignore percentages. See Flynn, Comparative Negligence: The
Debate, 8 TRIAL 49, 50 (1972). In the recent case of Acevedo v. Acosta, 296 So. 2d. 526
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), the court expressly approved the "judicial reduction" method (originally
used in Maine) thereby creating a "double reduction phenomenon."
This procedure solves one of the immediate problems which comparative negligence is
designed to prevent-a jury making hidden adjustments based on bias-but it still has the
potential to cover-up the tracks of a confused jury that may, for instance, misinterpret the
court's charge.
On the other hand, under the Hoffman procedure, the jury, preferably with special
verdict forms, determines the total losses sustained and the relative degree of fault and
then makes the reduction. The court scans the verdicts for any errors or inconsistencies (checks
the arithmetic) and effects the set-off. This procedure, it is submitted, avoids the double re-
duction phenomenon.
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surrounding their administration. In order to further assist in the transi-
tion from contributory negligence to comparative negligence, it invested
the trial judges of Florida with broad discretionary powers to effectuate
two basic purposes: 4
1
(1)To allow a jury to apportion fault as it sees fit between
negligent parties whose negligence was part of the legal and
proximate cause of any loss or injury; and
(2) To apportion the total damages resulting from the loss or
injury according to the proportional fault of each party.42
In summary, the court in Hoffman attempted to set out a rule of com-
parative negligence with a fairly broad plan for its administration. The
court recognized that it was indeed bound by judicial restraints which
would not permit it to decide several important collateral questions, 43
and that it could not anticipate many of the problems that were likely to
arise in the trial courts. Instead, the court set out its basic purposes,
gave trial judges broad discretion to administer the doctrine, and de-
clared that the plan would be applicable or inapplicable to different cases
according to their current progress in litigation and, if they were beyond
the trial stage, according to certain criteria for having preserved the right
on appeal.44 This then, is the present status of the comparative negli-
41. 280 So. 2d at 440. Note the similarity between the enumerated purposes and the
legislative intent section of a statute.
42. Id. at 439. See note 37 supra. See also, Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d 211, 108 N.W.2d
581 (1961), and notes 32 & 33 supra. A literal interpretation of the second of these enumerated
purposes suggests that it is the duty of the court to compute the diminished damages (the
total damages multiplied by the percentage of fault attributable to the adverse party) and
this interpretation was given effect in the, recent case of Acevedo v. Acosta, 296 So. 2d 526
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). However, the remainder of the opinion, including the portions quoted
in the text of this article, dearly indicate that it is the duty of the jury to compute the
diminished damages, and that the court is required only to effect the set-off if necessary.
See notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
43. As the court pointed out, the status of last clear chance under the comparative negli-
gence rule has been previously determined. Loftin v. Nolan, 86 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1956);
Martin v. Sussman, 82 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1955) (both holding that there is no place for the
last clear chance doctrine under a comparative negligence rule). Contra, Lowell v. Sanders-
ville R.R., 72 Ga. App. 692, 34 S.E.2d 644 (1945). The court expressly refused to consider
the status of assumption of risk and the prohibition against contribution among joint tort-
feasors vis-h-vis the comparative negligence rule. 280 So. 2d at 439. The court also failed
to mention the particularly knotty issue of whether an insurance carrier may take advantage
of the set-off. See section III, B, 2 infra.
44. The court set out five categories of cases in stating how the courts were to imple-
ment the Hoffman rule. It is to be applied in four of the categories: (1) to those cases in
which comparative negligence had already been applied; (2) to cases commenced, but still in
the pre-trial stage; (3) to those cases on appeal wherein comparative negligence had been made
an issue on appeal; and (4) to all cases commenced after the Hoffman decision had become
final (July 10, 1973). As to the last category-with regard to cases where trial had already
begun or wherein a verdict or judgment had already been rendered-the comparative negli-
gence rule was not to be applied, with the exception of those cases wherein the comparative
negligence rule was properly raised sometime during litigation. The question of what would
"properly raise" comparative negligence has already been adjudicated in Thornton v. El-
Hot, 288 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1974), quashing 267 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973); Orfaly v.
Jeffries, 290 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Butler v. Woolco Dep't Store, 284 So. 2d 434
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gence doctrine in Florida. However, as will be shown, the above repre-
sents only the "tip of the iceberg," and it is the submerged portion which
has the greatest potential for mischief.
II. FLORIDA AN FOREIGN PRECEDENT
A. Florida Law: Railroad and Hazardous
Occupations Statutes
1. IN GENERAL
In the Hoffman opinion, the supreme court referred to an "earlier
railroad statute," under which it was said there existed a body of case
law concerning comparative negligence, which should be applicable to
the "newly adopted" comparative negligence doctrine.45 Florida also
has a Hazardous Occupations Statute using comparative negligence, but
which the court did not cite as authority, probably because of the dearth
of cases arising thereunder.46 Even under the railroad statute, most of
the cases involved crossing accidents and provide no precedent for the
troublesome issues raised by the Hoffman decision. In fact, most merely
reiterate the basic comparative negligence rule as stated in the railroad
statute. However, there are a few interesting cases which deserve some
attention.
The railroad statute was first enacted in 1887,1 and was eventually
codified in the Florida Statutes (1941) as section 768.06.48 It provides
that where an individual is injured in an accident involving a railroad,
and both the plaintiff and the railroad, or one of its servants, are
causally negligent, then the plaintiff may recover diminished damages
according to the comparative negligence doctrine. The statute remained
in effect until 1965 when it was declared to be an unconstitutional denial
of equal protection to railroads.49 Although there has been argument to
the contrary, the statute has been held to have instituted a "pure form"
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). In Thornton v. Elliott, the trial court, without objection from either
counsel, charged the jury on the prohibition against comparative negligence. During its de-
liberations the jury returned to the courtroom and asked the judge what was to happen if
one party were to be found more negligent than the other. The judge merely repeated his
charge on the prohibition of the use of comparative negligence. Thus, according to the su-
preme -court, it was sufficient that the jury had "properly raised" the comparative negligence
rule to trigger the application of Hoffman.
45. 280 So. 2d at 439.
46. Florida's Hazardous Occupation Act, Florida Statutes ch. 769, since 1913 has applied
the comparative negligence rule to actions arising thereunder. FiA. STAT. § 769.03 (1973).
FA. STAT. § 769.04 (1973) expressly abolish the defense of assumption of risk with respect
to actions arising under the Act.
47. Fla. Laws 1887, ch. 3744.
48. Fla. Laws 1927, ch. 7052. The statute also provides that any injury sustained by one
who consents thereto (assumes the risk) may not be compensated under the statute.
49. Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Seven-up Bott. Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965). But see
Natchez & S.R.R. v. Crawford, 99 Miss. 697, 55 So. 596 (1911), wherein Mississippi's pure
form general comparative negligence statute was held to be constitutional.
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comparative negligence rule,50 and for that reason, the supreme court sug-
gested reliance on the railroad statute cases as precedent in applying
Hoffman. Although these cases do not solve the more troublesome prob-
lems, the following discussion will indicate their value in certain areas.
2. LAST CLEAR CHANCE
There is no doubt as to the status of the last clear chance doctrine
under comparative negligence. In Martin v. Sussman5 and again in Loftin
v. Nolan,52 the Supreme Court of Florida held that there is no justifica-
tion for the last clear chance rule under comparative negligence. The
court also clearly reasserted this position in Hoffman.53
3. SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE
There are several cases dealing with the type of negligence which
must be apportioned under the rule and with the question of sole proxi-
mate cause. In Florida Central & Pacific Railroad v. Williams,54 a trial
judge's failure to instruct the jury that, when apportioning damages
under the railroad statute,55 it should not take into account any negligence
of either party which did not proximately contribute to the accident, was
held to be reversible error. Therefore, non-causal negligence should not
be apportioned under the Hoffman rule. 6
It is clear that when the plaintiff's own conduct is the sole proximate
cause of his injury, he is barred from any recovery. However, what
constitutes sole proximate cause has been questioned, and at times it
seems that conduct amounting to assumption of risk (which is a complete
bar to recovery under the railroad statute) or even gross, wilfull, or
50. Compare Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876 (1894), with Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Willis, 58 Fla. 307, 51 So. 134 (1910).
51. 82 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1955). See note 43 supra.
52. 86 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1956). See note 43 supra.
53. 280 So. 2d at 438.
54. 37 Fla. 406, 20 So. 558 (1896). The proximate cause question, by itself, has caused
confusion. In Stringfellow v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 64 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1933), a man
and his minor son were killed in a railroad crossing accident. The trial court directed the
verdict for the railroad on the ground that the father's negligence was the sole proximate
cause of the accident. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
with regard to the father, but reversed on the son's claim. The majority held that since the
father's negligence cannot be imputed to the son, a jury could find that as to the son, the
railroad contributed to the accident, even though the father's claim was barred. The lone
dissenter, needless to say, found the majority's holding to be logically indefensible, in that
the majority found the railroad not negligent as a matter of law as to the father, but at
the same time it held that a jury could find the railroad negligent as to the son. The United
States Supreme Court agreed and subsequently reversed. Stringfellow v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 290 U.S. 322 (1933). On remand the Fifth Circuit held that the father's negligence
was not the sole proximate cause of the accident.
55. See Martin v. Makris, 101 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958) (holding that, on the
facts, the jury had the duty to assign a ratio of negligence to the parties).
56. See note 32 supra.
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wanton misconduct,57 has unfortunately been labeled sole proximate
cause. One case5 s held that the plaintiff's negligence was "so great" that
under the circumstances it constituted the sole proximate cause of the
accident. Another case59 held that where the plaintiff's conduct indicated
recklessness, heedlessness or a lack of prudence amounting to a positive
disregard of danger, it constituted the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent. (No mention was made of assumption of risk.)60 Finally, several
cases have impliedly reached the same conclusion by stating that there
must be some "appreciable" negligence on behalf of the defendant-
railroad before comparative negligence is applicable. 6' Therefore, in light
of the language contained in these cases, the defense of "sole proximate
cause" should be regarded with caution and where a party's conduct
amounts to assumption of risk, it should be labeled as such.
4. NEGLIGENCE PER SE
The effect of the negligence per se rule on the comparative negli-
gence doctrine was the subject of at least two cases. In Kirkpatrick v.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,2 the trial court instructed the jury that
the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, but that it should determine
whether or not the railroad was also negligent. If the jury found the
railroad negligent, it was then to apportion the negligence of the parties.
The plaintiff objected to this peremptory charge on the ground that under
the statute, the question of negligence had to go to the jury. The court,
relying on an earlier case,68 held that there was no error and that the
trial court could take the question of the negligence of either or both
parties from the jury, notwithstanding the comparative negligence statute.
5. IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE
There is a long line of cases holding that the comparative negligence
doctrine has no effect on Florida law which generally refuses to impute
negligence from one party to another except in master-servant cases and
a few other instances.6 4 However, if the negligence of the driver of an
automobile is found to be the sole proximate cause of the accident, his
57. See Florida E.C.R.R. v. Townsend, 104 Fla. 362, 140 So. 196, modified on other
grounds, 104 Fla. 362, 143 So. 445 (1932) (by implication).
58. Lowry v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 171 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1948).
59. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Padgett, 71 Fla. 90, 70 So. 998 (1916).
60. See note 48 supra.
61. See, e.g., Florida E.C.R.R. v. Townsend, 104 Fla. 362, 140 So. 196, modified on other
grounds, 104 Fla. 362, 143 So. 444 (1932).
62. 259 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1958).
63. Van Allen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 109 F.2d 780 (5th Cr. 1940).
64. Kirch v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 38 F.2d 963 (Sth Cir. 1930); Avecedo v. Acosta,
296 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974) ; Covington v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 99 Fla. 1102, 128,
So. 426 (1930); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Bazemore, 85 Fla. 164, 96 So. 297 (1923); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Crosby, 53 Fla. 400, 43 So. 318 (1907).
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passenger is barred from recovery. This is not because the driver's negli-
gence will be imputed to his passenger, but because the defendant is
simply free from fault.65
6. PLEADING
In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Britton,"' the court held that
under the railroad statute, contributory negligence is an affirmative de-
fense which should be pleaded and proved by the defendant, even though
it only went to reduce recovery rather than to bar it. However in Britton
and in several other cases, Florida courts have stated that a defendant's
failure to plead contributory negligence affirmatively did not prevent the
defendant from proving contributory negligence at trial, at least where
some type of affirmative defense was alleged. 7
7. REMITTITUR
The role of the trial judge as overseer of the apportionment process
is reflected by several cases concerning remittitur. In light of these cases
and of the broad grant of discretion to trial judges concerning the me-
chanics of apportionment in Hoffman,68 it seems certain that the way has
been cleared for judicial use of the remittitur device to insure jury
accuracy in following comparative negligence instructions. Although the
cases are sometimes unclear as to the ground upon which a remittitur
was ordered,69 on repeated occasions trial and appellate courts have
ordered remittiturs when it was demonstrated that the jury either failed
to apportion negligence at all, or did so incorrectly. 70 Particularly where
special verdicts are used, impropriety will be readily apparent to the
courts.
There are at least two cases 71 which demonstrate the use of a double
remittitur, where both the trial and appellate courts have ordered remit-
titurs. In Florida East Coast Railroad v. Buckles,72 the jury awarded the
plaintiff $10,000 in damages. The trial court ordered a $6,500 remittitur
and the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Florida ordered an-
65. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 94 Fla. 571, 113 So. 716 (1927) (dictum).
66. 109 Fla. 155, 192 So. 621 (1940); accord, Warfield v. Hepburn, 62 Fla. 49, 57 So.
618 (1912).
67. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Bracewell, 110 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959) (sole
proximate cause); Farnsworth v. Tampa Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 166, 57 So. 233 (1912) (general
denial).
68. See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 94 Fla. 571, 113 So. 716 (1927).
70. Martin v. Rivers, 72 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1954) (jury verdict of $26,500; remittitur
ordered for $16,250); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Terry, 101 Fla. 515, 134 So. 505 (1931)
(remittitur of excess over $5,000); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Watkins, 97 Fla. 350, 121
So. 95 (1929) (jury verdict of $10,000; remittitur order for $5,000 because the plaintiff's
negligence was "vastly greater" than that of the defendant).
71. Key West Elec. Co. v. Higgs, 118 Fla. 11, 136 So. 639 (1931); Florida E.C.R.R. v.
Buckles, 85 Fla. 416, 96 So. 397 (1923).
72. 85 Fla. 416, 96 So. 397 (1923).
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other remittitur of $2,000, leaving the plaintiff with $1,500, because of
the plaintiff's "great comparative fault." In general, the Florida courts
rarely hesitate to order a remittitur when warranted, 8 and should not
hesitate to do so under comparative negligence.
B. Value of Foreign Precedent
1. IN GENERAL
From the brief review of existing Florida law concerning compara-
tive negligence it is evident that it is insufficient to meet the requirements
of Florida attorneys and judges. Therefore, the trial bar and the judiciary
must look to other jurisdictions for guidance. The experiences and case
decisions of other jurisdictions are helpful, but they are also no panacea.
Furthermore, because of the diverse forms of comparative negligence, the
law established in many of these jurisdictions is entirely inapplicable in
Florida.
An in depth study of all the law provided by state and federal com-
parative negligence forms is beyond the scope of this article. However, a
brief survey of the law of a few jurisdictions is offered in order to demon-
strate the values and deficiencies of foreign precedent.
2. FEDERAL COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTES
The federal government has adopted the comparative negligence rule
in several statutes, although all are of limited application.74 These com-
parative negligence rules are of the pure form variety and are, there-
fore, of special value in Florida. However, because of their restricted
nature, they must be considered with caution.
The Federal Employers Liability Act7 (F.E.L.A.) is a pure form76
comparative negligence statute which governs actions brought by railroad
employees against their employers who are engaged in interstate com-
merce. In view of the multitude of cases decided thereunder, the statute
should be a valuable source of precedent. Its value, however, is limited.
For instance, if both the railroad and its employee are causally negligent
and both sustain damages, the employee may recover diminished dam-
ages pursuant to the comparative negligence rule. On the other hand, if
the railroad attempts to counter-claim for property damage resulting
from its employee's negligence, it is barred from recovery because the
contributory negligence rule is applied to it.77 Obviously then, F.E.L.A.
cases are of no value with respect to questions of counter-claims and set-
offs, which, under Hoffman, are a very vital part of the new Florida rule.
73. See Massey, Hoffman & Linder, Survey of Civil Procedure, 28 U. Mwa L. Rzv.
257 (1974).
74. F.E.L.A., Jones Act, Death on the High Seas Act. See note 18 supra.
75. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970).
76. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Thomas, 229 Ga. 301, 190 S.E.2d 898 (1972).
77. Kentucky & I.T.R.R. v. Martin, 437 S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1969).
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Prior to 1908, assumption of risk was a complete bar to recovery in
F.E.L.A. actions.7" In 1908, however, the act was amended to abolish
assumption of risk as a defense altogether. 79 Therefore, only those
F.E.L.A. cases decided before 1908 are of value in Florida on the question
of what status should be given to the defense under the Hoffman rule.80
However, the very fact that the defense was abrogated might have some
persuasive value to Florida law makers; but this does not necessarily fol-
low since the F.E.L.A. purpose of protecting employees had to have
been the overriding consideration in eliminating assumption of risk.
The Jones Act or Merchant Marine Act incorporates the F.E.L.A.
provisions by reference.8' Decisions arising under this Act are, therefore,
subject to the same strengths and weaknesses as those construing F.E.L.A.
Although the F.E.L.A. provision abolishing assumption of risk was not
incorporated into the Jones Act, it appears that the defense has not been
recognized .8 2
The Death on the High Seas Act 8 contains a terse provision stating
that recovery is reduced by contributory negligence. There are relatively
few cases construing it.
3. JURISDICTIONS ADOPTING THE PURE FORM RULE
Mississippi, Rhode Island, Puerto Rico, Washington and possibly
New York have pure form comparative negligence laws. 4 Of the five,
only the Mississippi law85 is of any material value at this juncture. The
other laws are of too recent origin to have generated much case law of
value to Florida.
The Mississippi statute was first enacted in 1910."e There is a large
body of useful case law decided thereunder,87 although no case has been
78. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (1914).
79. 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1970).
80. See section II, C, 6 infra.
81. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958); Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S.
207 (1954).
82. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939) (equating assumption
of risk with contributory negligence). Accord, DuBose v. Matson Nav. Co., 403 F.2d 875
(9th Cir. 1968).
83. 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1970).
84. See note 19 supra.
85. Miss. CovE Amr. § 11-7-15 (1972). The statute contains no provision for special ver-
dicts, and the jury is given a free hand to apportion thereunder with a minimum of judicial
guidance.
86. Miss. Laws 1910, ch. 135. This statute, dealing with personal injuries only, was
amended in 1920 to include property damages. Miss. Laws 1920, ch. 312.
87. See, e.g., (1) Ideal Cement Co. v. Killingsworth, 198 So. 2d 248 (1967) (remittitur);
(2) White v. Mississippi P. & L. Co., 196 So. 2d 343 (Miss. 1967) (issue of plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence should rarely be taken from jury) ; (3) Herrington v. Hodges, 249 Miss.
131, 161 So. 2d 194 (1964) (pleading); (4) Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685
(1964); Vaughan v. Bollis, 221 Miss. 589, 73 So. 2d 160 (1954) (where defendant is negli-
gent as a matter of law, the jury may still find the plaintiff negligent as well and apportion
damages); (5) Ginn v. Culpepper, 243 Miss. 55, 137 So. 2d 179 (1962) (where defendant's
insurer paid the plaintiff and obtained a release, the court granted defendant awards on his
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found concerning the troublesome set-off problem for which it was noted
above that F.E.L.A. was also of no help. The statute has been the subject
of substantial commentary,"8 but part of this is only because, being of
a pure form, it has been considered a curious deviation from the ordinary
comparative negligence law. It seems Mississippi has little to offer in the
area of precedent for multiple party comparative negligence litigation
and, thus, is of only minimal value in a second troublesome area.
4. JURISDICTIONS ADOPTING THE NON-PURE RULES
Of the twenty-three jurisdictions having non-pure forms of compara-
tive negligence (of which there are twenty jurisdictions having the modi-
fied-form rule)8 9 Wisconsin's statute,90 and the case law decided there-
under, is perhaps the most valuable single source of precedent for the
Florida trial bar and judges.
The Wisconsin statute has drawn considerable commentary and,
like the F.E.L.A., there is a multitude of cases decided thereunder, many
of which are of great import.9 2 Wisconsin has long been recognized as
the leading comparative negligence jurisdiction. Its controversial special
verdict system has undergone rigorous judicial and non-judicial analysis,
and the state has long recognized contribution among joint tortfeasors 3
The history of the Wisconsin statute has been discussed elsewhere. 4
However, a few interesting aspects thereof are appropriate for considera-
tion here. The statute, as originally enacted in 1931, was of the modified-
49% form. Although much of the criticism directed towards it concerned
counterclaim on grounds that both parties were negligent); (6) Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss.
814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947) (defense of assumption of risk is a bar to recovery under the
comparative negligence statute); (7) Mississippi P. & L Co. v. Whitescarvers, 68 F.2d 928
(5th Cir. 1934) (Mississippi's comparative negligence statute is substantive); (8) Mobile &
O.R.R. v. Campbell, 114 Miss. 803, 75 So. 554 (1917) (plaintiff may recover all damages
where liability arose from breach of safety statute under which contributory negligence was
not a defense); (9) Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 So. 835 (1917);
Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Carroll, 103 Miss. 830, 60 So. 1013 (1912) (a plaintiff guilty of even
gross negligence is not barred as long as the defendant was negligent, but the court will
closely scrutinize these cases and order remittitur if warranted); (10) Natchez & S.R.R. v.
Crawford, 99 Miss. 697, 55 So. 596 (1911) (upholding the constitutionality of the Mississippi
comparative negligence statute).
88. Ghiardi & Hogan, supra note 13, at 544 n.19, 560; 57 Am. JUR. 2d Negligence §§ 443-
45; Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463 (1970); Shell & Bufkin, Comparative Negligence in Mississippi,
27 Miss. L.J. 105 (1956).
89. See notes 25-27 supra.
90. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1974).
91. See, e.g., HErr & HET, supra note 13, §§ 1.310, 3.570; Ghiardi & Hogan, supra note
13, at 566.
92. Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970); Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Bieski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d
105 (1962); McConville v. State Farm Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962);
Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d 211, 108 N.W.2d 581 (1961).
93. Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918). See HEFT &
HEFT, supra note 13, § 1.310 (stating that Wisconsin is among a minority of states which
have adopted contribution among joint tortfeasors by judicial decision).
94. See notes 19 & 26, supra.
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the elaborate and cumbersome special verdict system which it spawned, 5
Dean Prosser9" and even the Supreme Court of Wisconsin began to crit-
icize the form of comparative negligence chosen by the Wisconsin legis-
lature. In Spath v. Sereda,97 Lawyer v. Park Falls,"8 and Vincent v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 19 the highest Wisconsin court expressed its distaste for the
modified and preference for the pure form. In Vincent, Chief Justice
Hallows declared that he favored the judicial adoption of the pure
form.100 Apparently in deference thereto, the Wisconsin legislature
amended the statute and adopted the modified-50% form shortly there-
after.101 The Wisconsin experience, therefore, would seem to be that of
a judiciary, required by its legislature to administer a modified form of
comparative negligence, but desirous of instituting the pure form rule. 0 2
The Wisconsin law and practice, though of great value generally, is
of little value with respect to some of the more difficult problems likely
to arise in Florida. Prior to the 1971 amendment of the comparative negli-
gence statute, there was little or no opportunity for a set-off to result in
Wisconsin (or the problems accompanying it), for the 49% form per-
mitted only the party whose fault was not as great as that of his adversary
to recover. Therefore, the pre-1971 case law is of no benefit to Florida in
that area. Furthermore, most multi-party litigation arising out of Wis-
consin has dealt with the issue of whether the plaintiff's negligence
should be compared to the negligence of each defendant individually
(thus reducing his chances of recovery), or to all of the defendants as a
unit. 03 However, as discussed in section III, A, 4, d (2) (a) infra, Wis-
consin has a pure form of comparative negligence applied to contribu-
tion among tortfeasors, and thus could lend guidance to Florida in the
event this state adopts a similar plan for settlement among multiple
parties.
Ostensibly the 1971 amendment will give rise to potential set-offs
95. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 13, at 131-35. See section III, A, 5 infra.
96. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. Rav. 465, 494 (1953). In this article,
Dean Prosser states:
It appears impossible to justify the [Wisconsin modified form] rule on any basis
except one of pure political compromise. It is difficult to be happy about the Wis-
consin cases, or to escape the conclusion that at the cost of many appeals they have
succeeded merely in denying apportionment in many cases where it should have
been made.
97. 35 Wis. 2d 308, 151 N.W.2d 68 (1967).
98. 41 Wis. 2d 448, 164 N.W.2d 246 (1969).
99. 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970).
100. Id. at 131 (dissent). See Flynn, Comparative Negligence: The Debate, 8 TR=i 49,
51 (1972).
101. See note 19 supra.
102. Interestingly enough, Wisconsin has always implemented the pure-form rule in
contribution cases. See HEr & HEFT, supra note 13, § 1.40, at 13.
103. Assuming that plaintiff, P, is 40% negligent, one defendant, D1, is 30% negligent
and the other defendant, D2 , is 30% negligent, if plaintiff's negligence is compared to each
defendant individually, then under the modified form he may not recover against either of
them. However, if the negligence of the defendants is taken as a unit, then plaintiff may re-
cover 60% of his damages.
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and helpful multi-party decisions."° Therefore, Wisconsin should become
a more valuable source of precedent in the future.
C. Effect of Comparative Negligence on Existing Florida Law
1. IN GENERAL
This section offers a brief survey of several areas of Florida law
which may affect the comparative negligence rule, or which may be
affected by it. A few legal rules and principles will be examined in order
to predict their potential interaction with the new apportionment process.
Among the areas to be considered is the status of contributory
negligence under existing Florida law, which will be examined in several
contexts in order to determine in which instances the defense is and is
not available. In those cases to which the defense applies, the effect of
the comparative negligence rule will be discussed. One general rule must
be kept in mind throughout the discussion of defenses. Whenever conduct
amounting to contributory negligence was a complete defense in a civil
action prior to the adoption of comparative negligence, the same conduct
will continue to be a defense under the comparative negligence doctrine.
However, instead of barring recovery, contributory negligence will oper-
ate to reduce it pursuant to the apportionment process. 05
The controversial defense of assumption of risk will also be examined
and will be compared with contributory negligence in order to determine
whether assumption of risk should be retained intact as a complete bar to
recovery, or subjected to the comparative negligence rule, or abolished
altogether. Finally, the little understood seat-belt defense will be re-
examined in light of the comparative negligence rule.
2. LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The first area to be definitely affected by comparative negligence is
the doctrine of last clear chance. The last clear chance rule is now inappli-
cable in any action to which comparative negligence applies. 06
3. IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE
The comparative negligence rule will probably have little or no
effect on the principles governing imputed negligence in Florida.107 There
appears to be no reason why the apportionment scheme should affect the
threshold question of whether the law will charge one with the negligence
of another. However, problems may arise concerning the significance
104. Since all parties may recover if all are found to be equally at fault, set-off seems to
be the logical method of "settling up" after trial, unless the Wisconsin courts prohibit its use.
See section III, A infra.
105. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 128-29.
106. See notes 43 & 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
107. See section II, A, S supra.
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of imputed negligence. For instance, when one lends his automobile to
another and the borrower negligently strikes a third person therewith,
the negligence of the driver is imputed to the owner under Florida's dan-
gerous instrumentality doctrine. 08 How then is the "imputed negligence"
to be characterized and apportioned by the jury? This type of "negli-
gence" is definitely not of the same character or degree as that of the
driver and it may not even be causal in the technical sense.109 Even so,
it is the public policy of Florida to hold the owner as well as the driver
accountable for the injury. Faced with this problem, the court might
instruct the jury to apportion "culpability" rather than causal fault, or
it could define and explain the public policy involved and leave the entire
matter to the jury. Perhaps the most expeditious solution would be to
leave the matter to the jury.110 On the other hand, if the owner negligently
entrusts his vehicle to the driver then his negligence can easily be appor-
tioned along with that of the driver and of the injured third party.
The effect of imputed negligence must certainly be reconsidered if
Florida adopts contribution among joint tortfeasors. This matter is dis-
cussed in section III, A, 4, d of this article.
4. NEGLIGENCE PER SE
Under existing Florida law, if a plaintiff is found to have violated one
of a certain class of statutes, or if the question of his negligence is taken
from the jury, he is considered to be negligent as a matter of law. Assum-
ing that his conduct causally contributed to his injury, he would have
been barred from recovery under the contributory negligence rule. How-
ever, under the comparative negligence doctrine there is no reason why
negligence per se should not be subjected to the apportionment process.
The case law arising under Florida's comparative negligence rail-
road statute provides some guidance for combining the negligence per se
rule with the comparative negligence doctrine."' If, in a two-party action,
the defendant is found to be negligent per se, the action should proceed
as any other action under the apportionment rule. If the plaintiff is
negligent as a matter of law, however, the jury should be instructed that
it must first determine whether or not the defendant is negligent as
well. Then if the jury finds that the defendant is also causally negli-
gent, it should apportion the negligence of both parties in the usual
manner.' 2 The court should retain the authority under the comparative
108. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
109. If the owner's negligence Is not causal, it Is difficult to see how it can be subjected
to the Hoffman rule at all. See notes 32, 54 & 55 supra and accompanying text. See aso
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 128-31.
110. Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis. 2d 211, 108 N.W.2d 581 (1961). See HzIrr & Hzrr,
supra note 13, g 1.240; 57 Am. JuR. 2d Negligence § 447-48 (1971). See note 32 supra.
111. See section IT, A, 4 supra.
112. Kirkpatrick v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 259 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1998); Cline v.
Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628 (1939) (by Implication); Winfield v. Magee, 232 Miss. 37,
98 So. 2d 130 (1937).
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negligence rule to take the question of the negligence of either or both
parties from the jury.113
The question remains, however, whether or not a plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence is a defense at all to conduct amounting to negligence
per se, for if it is not, there may be no need for instituting the appor-
tionment rule.114 In the recent case of de Jesus v. Seaboard Coast Line
Railroad,"5 the Supreme Court of Florida set out, in hornbook fashion,
the law concerning defenses to conduct amounting to negligence per se.
Three categories of statutes and ordinances were considered. The first
were the strict liability statutes, which are enacted for the purpose of
establishing a strict duty of care towards a class of persons who are
deemed to be unable to protect themselves, such as a statute prohibiting
the sale of firearms to minors. Violation of a statute falling within this
category was held to be negligence per se and contributory negligence
was held not to constitute a defense thereto.18 Second was a category of
laws, usually penal in nature, which impose a duty upon someone to
protect a particular class of persons from a particular injury, such as a
railroad safety statute,"7 or a seed labeling statute'" or a non-traffic city
ordinance.11 9 Violation of a law falling within this category was held to be
negligence per se, but contributory negligence was held to constitute a de-
fense thereto.120 The third category was said to consist of any other statute
or ordinance (such as traffic ordinances). Violations of a traffic ordinance
were held to be only prima facie evidence of negligence, 12' and would
definitely be subject to comparative negligence apportionment.
The second and third categories of statutes present no particular
problem for the bench and bar with respect to the comparative negligence
rule. However violation of the strict liability type of statute creates a
problem. Should the plaintiff's contributory negligence become a limited
defense to negligence per se resulting from the violation of this type of
statute in view of the comparative negligence rule, or should it remain
no defense at all? Wisconsin subjects the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence to the apportionment rule in this kind of case. 2 It may be that
the proper body to consider this public policy question is the state legisla-
ture which enacts the negligence per se rules.
113. Van Allen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 109 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1940).
114. Now that contributory negligence no longer operates to bar recovery altogether,
perhaps there is no need to continue to proscribe the rule in these cases.
115. 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973), rev'g 266 So.. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), noted in 28
U. MIA L. REv. 719 (1974).
116. 281 So. 2d at 200-01; Tamlami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959).
117. 281 So. 2d at 200.
118. Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953).
119. Richardson v. Fountain, 154 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
120. 281 So. 2d at 200; Richardson v. Fountain, 154 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1963).
121. 281 So. 2d at 201.
122. Cf. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 462, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65 (1967). See
notes 171-73 infra and accompanying text.
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5. STATUS OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE
The availability of contributory negligence (and like defenses) as a
defense to tort liability will not, in most cases, be altered by the adoption
of the comparative negligence doctrine. Only the effect of contributory
negligence will change. That is to say, whenever contributory negligence
barred a plaintiff's recovery before the adoption of comparative negli-
gence, it will remain a defense under the doctrine, except that the recovery
will be diminished rather than barred. Therefore, as in the case of the
negligence per se rule,12 it is necessary to answer two questions: (1) to
which actions is contributory negligence not a defense (this question is
necessary because even in those cases where contributory negligence was
not a defense, it may now be desirable to make it a defense); and (2) in
those actions where contributory negligence is a defense, how will it be
apportioned under the Hoffman rule? With these questions in mind, sev-
eral areas of tort law will be surveyed in order to provide a representative
sampling of the effect of comparative negligence on existing Florida law.
a. Gross Negligence and Willful, Wanton Conduct
There are at least three degrees of negligence recognized in Florida:
ordinary negligence, gross negligence and willful, wanton misconduct. 24
It is settled in Florida that contributory negligence is a defense to
gross negligence,' 25 but that it is not a defense to willful, wanton miscon-
duct.126 This general rule as stated seems simple enough. However the
Florida courts have experienced considerable difficulty distinguishing
among degrees of negligence,'12 aided and abetted by their own careless
use of terminology. 128 Therefore, there arises the problem of distinguish-
ing between gross negligence and willful, wanton misconduct.
In all probability, part of the reason for the creation of the degrees
of negligence was to effectuate Florida's guest statute,'129 which has been
123. See section II, C, 4 supra.
124. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959). Willful, wanton misconduct, in a
civil action, is defined to be the same type of willful, wanton misconduct required to sus-
tain a recovery for punitive damages or to sustain a conviction for manslaughter by culpable
negligence. Id.; National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Holland, 269 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1972); FLA. ST. JuRY INSTR. (CIVIm) 3.5 d and comment. Gross negligence is defined to be
an act or omission "that a reasonably careful person would know probably and most
likely result in an injury or damage to other persons or to property." FLA. STD. JuRY INSTR.
(CivL) 4.2.
125. Johnson v. Rinesmith, 238 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
126. Florida Ry. v. Dorsey, 59 Fla. 260, 52 So. 963 (1910); Florida S.R.R. v. Hlrst,
30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506, 613 (1892); Johnson v. Rinesmith, 238 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1969); Glaab v. Caudill, 236 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
127. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959) ; Johnson v. Rinesmith, 238 So. 2d
659 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) ; Glaab v. Caudill, 236 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
128. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 21 (Fla. 1959). See 280 So. 2d at 437 (wherein
the court fails to distinguish between gross negligence and willful, wanton misconduct).
129. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1971). See note 127 supra.
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repealed.8 0 Furthermore, the Hoffman court characterized the "gross,
willful, and wanton negligence doctrine" along with the last clear chance
doctrine as efforts to ameliorate the harshness of contributory negli-
gence.18' Therefore, it is submitted that this artificial and confusing body
of law is no longer needed. A plaintiff's contributory negligence should
be subjected to the apportionment rule regardless of whether the defen-
dant's conduct is labeled ordinary negligence, gross negligence or willful,
wanton misconduct." 2 If this course of action is followed, the comparative
negligence rule will operate (in this instance) to simplify Florida law
rather than to complicate it.
b. Warranty Liability
An in depth examination of the status of contributory negligence
as a defense to warranty liability is beyond the scope of this article.183
An outline of the problems involved in this confused area of the law is
offered however, because of the dearth of case law in Florida on the
subject.
The source of much of the confusion surrounding this area is termi-
nology. Legal scholars have never agreed on whether a warranty action
is ex contractu or ex delicto in nature. Furthermore, various courts hold
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, misuse, and lack of causation
to be defenses to warranty liability.184 The cases, reflecting in part the
confusion surrounding terminology, support almost every imaginable
proposition. Some courts hold that contributory negligence is a defense
to warranty liability, 88 whereas other courts refuse to consider contrib-
utory negligence at all.'88 Almost all courts recognize assumption of -risk
to be a valid defense, although some courts disapprove of the label." 7
130. Fla. Laws, 1972, ch. 72-1.
131. 280 So. 2d at 437.
132. This is the Wisconsin solution. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 114 N.W.2d
105, 112-13 (1962). See note 127 supra.
133. See 2 FRThmER & FiRsamw, PRODUCTS L.iarrrY §§ 16.01[31, 19.08(11] (1973);
Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiffs' Conduct, 1968 UTAn L. REv. 267;
Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk,
25 VAm. L. REv. 93 (1972); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965). Warranty liability and strict
liability in tort involve similar problems and require similar analysis. Therefore, benefit may
be obtained from an examination of cases concerning strict liability, and a comparison of
those cases, with the cases in this section. See section II, C, 5, c infra.
134. Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965).
135. Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bott. Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964); Nelson
v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955); Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas
Serv., 468 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1970).
136. Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966); Williams
v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 III. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Hinderer v. Ryan, 7 Wash. App.
434, 499 P.2d 252 (1972).
137. Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola
Bott. Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963) (disapproving of the label "assumption
of risk"); Young v. Coca-Cola Bott. Co., 109 R.I. 458, 287 A.2d 345 (1972).
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Misuse is also recognized by every court. However the term "misuse"
has been subject to differing interpretations. 38 It is often stated that
misuse goes to proximate causation, so that when the consumer misuses
the product, the cause of the accident is his conduct rather than the de-
fect.'89 Misuse also tends to negate the existence of a warranty in that the
warranty is only intended to extend to normal usage of the product. Fi-
nally, misuse can be considered to be a synonym for contributory negli-
gence or assumption of risk.140 The Uniform Commercial Code appears
to consider misuse, contributory negligence and assumption of risk to be
defenses to warranty liability,' although it emphasizes the aspect of
causation. 42
Despite the use of different labels, a majority of the cases are con-
sistent in that, the conduct which has been held to constitute a defense
is similar. Therefore the confusion surrounding defenses to warranty
liability could very well be a mere problem of semantics. 3
As previously stated, there is a dearth of case law in Florida con-
cerning defenses to an action for breach of warranty. 44 In Coleman v.
American Universal, Inc., 45 the District Court of Appeal, First District,
passed directly on the question at hand. However, it did so in such a
manner as to create even more confusion. In Coleman, an action for
breach of an implied warranty was brought by the lessee of a defective
scaffold against the lessor, to which the lessor pleaded contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk. The lessee appealed from an adverse
judgment, charging as error the court's instruction on contributory
negligence. The First District indicated that the various state courts and
the text writers were split on the question of whether contributory negli-
gence is a defense to warranty liability. Then it held that:
In this legal situation, with the authorities fairly evenly divided,
we are inclined to the view that contributory negligence is avail-
able as a defense in an action for breach of implied warranty,
even though it may superficially look as though we are thereby
approving a tortious defense in an action ex contractu. 48
138. See, e.g., Coleman v. American Univ., Inc., 264 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972);
Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970) (con-
taining an excellent analysis of misuse); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965).
139. UNIlFOnPM Com cm=. CODE § 2-314, Comment 13; § 2-316, Comment 8; § 2-715,
Comment 5 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]. Coleman v. American Univ., Inc., 264 So. 2d 451
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
140. See Coleman v. American Univ., Inc., 264 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
141. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b).
'142. See note 141 supra.
143. See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDWn , PRoDucTs LIABnTy § 16.01[3] (1973).
144. In Power Ski, Inc. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 188 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), the
court, in dicta, stated that "a manufacturer should not be liable for a product which fails
because it was improperly compounded, mishandled or misused." Id. at 14.
145. 264 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
146. Id. at 454.
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After quoting at length from one text,147 and incorporating the language
of another by reference, 48 the court stated that although the trial court's
instruction ostensibly pertained to contributory negligence, it was, in
essence, a charge on misuse, or a charge characterizing the plaintiff's con-
duct as the sole proximate cause of his injuries. It appears as though
this statement materially contributes to the confusion over terminology
and will hinder the prospective application of the Coleman case. There-
fore, Coleman represents a rough guide to the potential status of contrib-
utory negligence (or misuse) in warranty actions.
It is submitted that regardless of the label employed, conduct
amounting to contributory negligence or misuse should be subject to
the apportionment process in all warranty actions.149 Conduct amounting
to assumption of risk should, however, remain as a bar to recovery in
the proper cases, if Florida chooses to retain the doctrine as advocated
elsewhere in this article. 50
c. Strict Liability in Tort
(1) Precedent with Respect to Strict Liability
The same confusion concerning terminology and policy which plagues
warranty actions also pervades strict liability actions. 5' Fortunately, how-
ever, there is a body of case law in Florida which may provide some
guidance to the status of contributory negligence in strict liability actions.
Strict liability imposed by statute is exemplified by Florida's "dog
bite statutes.' 52 Under these statutes dog owners incur strict liability for
injuries caused by their dogs, and liability is based on the owner's obli-
gation as an insurer rather than on negligence. Thus, ordinary contribu-
tory negligence has been held not to be a defense to this form of strict
liability. 55 On the other hand, assumption of risk is an enumerated de-
147. 2 FRUMR & FRiEDMAN, PRODUCTS LI.BILITY § 16.01[31 (1973). Because of the
wide range of material contained in the quoted portion, it is difficult to predict exactly
which portion of the quoted statements, if not all, the court meant to adopt.
148. ScHREIBER & RHEINGOLD, PRODUCTS L ABITY ch. 5, at 32 (1967).
149. See notes 171-73 infra and accompanying text.
150. See section 11, C, 6 infra.
151. Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiffs' Conduct, 1968 UTAH
L. Rzv. 267.
152. FLA. STAT. §§ 767.01, .04 (1973). The former imposes strict liability on owners
of dogs for damage they may cause to livestock or to persons. The latter imposes strict liabil-
ity for dog bites and creates certain enumerated defenses thereto. The two statutes have
often been confused. In Romfh v. Berman, 56 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1951), it was held that
section 767.04 superseded section 767.01 with respect to personal injuries caused by dogs.
However in Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1965), aff'g 173 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964), the Supreme Court of Florida held that section 767.04 supersedes section 767.01
only with respect to bites, thereby partially overruling Romfh. The statutes are still con-
fused, however; See note 158 infra.
153. English v. Seachord, 243 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), writ discharged, 259
So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1972); Knapp v. Ball, 175 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Vandercar v.
David, 96 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957).
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fense in one statute,154 and conduct amounting to assumption of risk (or
sole proximate cause) 55 has been held to be a defense under both
statutes. 156
In a case of first impression one Florida court recently imposed
strict liability on the owner of an animal in the absence of statute. In
Issacs v. Powell,07 the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held
the owner of a chimpanzee strictly liable for injuries sustained by a
child while feeding it. The dog bite statute, though found to be persuasive,
was held to be inapplicable, so that the court was required to extend the
strict liability doctrine to non-statutory actions.5 8 With respect to poten-
tial defenses, the court held that even though liability is "absolute," the
owner is not the insurer of the victim. However, "the owner ought not
be relieved from such liability by slight negligence or want of ordinary
care on the part of the person injured. The latter's act must be such as
would establish that, with knowledge of the danger, he voluntarily
brought calamity upon himself.' '159
Finally there is strict products liability pursuant to section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 60 Although Florida courts have
long refused to adopt the strict liability theory in products cases,' 61 it is
likely that they may soon join the majority of jurisdictions which recog-
nize the doctrine. In fact, section 402A has been applied by the District
Court of Appeal, First District, in a recent products liability case. 0 2
Nevertheless, it is necessary to look to other jurisdictions to determine
whether or not defenses to section 402A have been recognized. 63 Com-
ment n to section 402A states:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based
upon the negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule
154. FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1973) states in part:
no owner . . . shall be liable . . . to any person . . . when such person shall
mischievously or carelessly provoke or aggravate the dog inflicting such damage;
nor shall any such owner be so liable if at the time of any such injury he had
displayed in a prominent place on his premises a sign easily readable including
the words "Bad Dog."
155. See Knapp v. Ball, 175 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). See' section 1I, C, 6 infra.
156. English v. Seachord, 243 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), writ discharged, 259
So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1972).
157. 267 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
158. The court cited FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1973) which is the dog bite statute. It is
wholly inapplicable to non-bite injuries. FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1973) applies to non-bite
injuries. See note 152 supra.
159. 267 So. 2d at 866-67. The court quoted RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF ToRTs § 515
(1965) stating that contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability imposed for
injuries caused by animals, except where contributory negligence amounts to a voluntary
and unreasonable exposure to risk. See note 243 infra.
160. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TOUTs § 402A (1965). See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240
(1972). A rapidly growing majority of jurisdictions recognize section 402A-type of strict
liability.
161. McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965); Lipsius v. Bristol-Myers
Co., 265 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
162. Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Dept. Stores, Inc., 291 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
163. Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
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applied to strict liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in
the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which
consists in voluntary and unreasonably proceeding to encounter
a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of as-
sumption of risk, is a defense under this section as in other cases
of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect
and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreason-
ably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is
barred from recovery.164
Several courts have adopted comment n.115 However, other courts have
not made a distinction between one's "failure to discover or foresee dan-
gers which the ordinary person would have discovered [and] negligent
conduct after discovery of the danger in the use of the product [which]
constitute[s] a defense to an action based on strict liability." 6 '
Assumption of risk is perhaps the most successful defense to strict
liability actions.'67 Misuse is also recognized as a defense,168 especially
in those instances where the defect was known by the consumer to exist.16 9
Thus, it appears that certain defenses do exist to strict liability.
(2) Comparative Negligence and Strict Liability
Assuming that certain conduct, whatever the label, amounts to a
defense to strict products liability, there remains the question of whether
to apply comparative negligence. If it is to be applied, a further inquiry
must be made in order to determine how,170 for the jury must be asked
to compare the fault of the plaintiff with the liability absolutely incurred
by the defendant.
This question was considered by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
164. It should be noted that assumption of risk, as stated in Comment n, is used in
its secondary sense and as such it is akin to contributory negligence. Therefore, it should
be subjected to the apportionment rule. See notes 194-96 infra and accompanying text.
165. O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Williams v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris,
147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970).
166. Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 249, 266 A.2d 855, 857 (1970).
See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); cf. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment
8. See notes 139 & 141 supra.
167. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Baker v.
Rosemurgy, 4 Mich. App. 195, 144 N.W.2d 660 (1966); Lee v. Crockson Coca-Cola Bott.
Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426 (1971); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833,
454 P.2d' 205 (1969). See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
168. O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968).
169. Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681
(1970).
170. If conduct is labeled assumption of risk however, recovery may be barred alto-
gether and, thus, the contributory negligence rule need not be implemented. See section 1I,
C, 6 infra.
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Dippel v. Sciano,'7' wherein it adopted section 402A strict products liabil-
ity for the first time.172 It stated that ordinary contributory negligence
will be a defense to strict liability in that the consumer or user of a
product has a duty to use ordinary care to protect himself from known or
apparent danger. An argument was made that since liability of a defen-
dant is absolute, there is no negligence on behalf of the defendant to
compare under the comparative negligence statute. The court countered
this argument by reasoning that section 402A liability is akin to negli-
gence per se and that since both doctrines are judicially created, there is
no reason to treat the two differently. Thus, strict liability was held to
be subject to the apportionment statute in the same manner as negligence
per se.
If [strict] liability were imposed for violation of a [safety]
statute it is difficult to perceive why we would not consider it
negligence per se for the purpose of applying the comparative
negligence statute . . . . The violation of a safety statute can
create a condition that constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm
to others. If this unreasonable danger is a cause, a substantial
factor, in producing the injury complained of, it can be com-
pared with the causal contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
In this area, it appears that Wisconsin has laid a predicate upon
which Florida can build.
6. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
a. Current Status
The status of assumption of risk as a defense to tort liability under
the comparative negligence rule was purposely left undecided by the
Hoffman court.174 It will undoubtedly become a hotly debated issue and
one with which Florida attorneys and judges will ultimately have to
cope.1 75 The problems in determining the role of assumption of risk arise
out of three areas- (1) the conflict in case law concerning the distinction
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence; (2) the exact
nature of the defense itself; and (3) the various policy considerations
involved. Since under the contributory negligence doctrine it oftentimes
made little difference what label the defense was given (because proof
of either assumption of risk or contributory negligence resulted in a
complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery),176 courts in every state have had
171. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
172. Although the court recognized that its discussion concerning defenses was obiter
dicta, it decided that an appropriate guide was necessary should the case be tried on a
theory of strict liability in tort. Id. at 462, 155 N.W.2d at 65.
173. Id. at 462, 155 N.W.2d at 64-65.
174. 280 So. 2d at 439.
175. See Fisher & Wax, supra note 13, at 568-69.
176. See, e.g., Gavel v. Girton, 183 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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only mixed success in distinguishing the two defenses, even though a
majority of courts seem to have tried. 77
b. Definitions
Contributory negligence is usually defined as conduct (an act or
omission) on the part of the plaintiff, or which is imputed to him, which
is a contributing legal cause of his injury and which falls under the stan-
dard of care to which he is required to conform for his own protection.17 s
On the other hand, assumption of risk has been generally applied to cases
where one has voluntarily and deliberately exposed himself to danger or
a risk of injury, even though he actually knew of and appreciated the
risk and had the opportunity to avoid it.' 79 It is already clear that con-
tributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to recovery under com-
parative negligence. However, in order to determine whether or not
conduct amounting to assumption of risk should be subject to apportion-
ment of fault under the comparative negligence rule, the courts will have
to take a discriminating look at the two defenses.
c. Legal Distinctions
At first blush it appears that the two defenses are readily distinguish-
able and have an entirely separate field of operation.' 80 Even the theories
underlying the two can readily be distinguished.'' Contributory negli-
gence is based on the theory that one who causally contributes to his
own injury should not be permitted to recover therefor, whereas as-
sumption of risk is said to rest on a theory of consent and is based
on the legal maxim, "volenti non fit injuria."'18 2 The defense of con-
tributory negligence admits, in effect, the defendant's negligence. It
arises from a lack of due care on the part of the plaintiff in failing
to comply with a given standard of care. There is a definite aspect of un-
reasonableness and therefore fault on behalf of the plaintiff. 3 Further-
more the conduct involved in contributory negligence must be causally
connected with the injury. 4
177. Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1962) (containing an exhaustive review of cases attempt-
ing to distinguish between assumption of risk and contributory negligence). See Dobbs,
supra note 13, at 373-78.
178. RESTATEMINT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965); PRossER, supra note 13, § 65, at
416-17.
179. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Magnuson, 288 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974);
Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947).
180. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (1914).
181. Prescott v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d 158, 265 P.2d 904 (1954); Landrum
v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943); cf. Ewer v. Johnson, 44 Wash. 2d 746, 270
P.2d 813 (1954).
182. Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955).
183. Prescott v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d 158, 265 P.2d 904 (1954); Byers v.
Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947).
184. Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 189 A. 260 (1937); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss.
814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947).
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In cases involving assumption of risk, the defendant's negligence is,
in effect, denied in that the very allegation of assumption of risk denies
the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant towards the plain-
tiff.18 5 Since the plaintiff consensually, voluntarily and knowingly chooses
to place himself in a position of danger vis-&-vis the defendant, there
arises no duty on the defendant's behalf to avoid injuring the plaintiff. 86
There need not be any causal connection between the conduct amounting
to assumption of risk and the injury or damage,1 7 and the plaintiff need
not act in an unreasonable manner. In fact, his actions may be eminently
reasonable as where the risk is outweighed by the potential benefit in-
volved, as in the case of a professional quarterback or an Apollo astro-
naut.188
There is another line of authority which has viewed the distinction
merely as one of degree. 8 9 In the courts subscribing to this viewpoint,
the two defenses are sometimes said to overlap.' 90 However, the plain-
tiff's conduct is sometimes gross or reckless so that it approaches assump-
tion of risk, or more significantly, the plaintiff by voluntarily incurring an
unreasonable risk is negligent. 91
A third line of cases attempts to reconcile the other two by closely
examining the nature of assumption of risk. In the leading case of Meis-
trich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,19 2 the court, after conducting a
cogent analysis of the nature of assumption of risk, determined that
there were two aspects or meanings of the defense. One meaning, the
185. Fowler v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 121 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960); Byers v.
Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955); McEvoy v. New York, 266 App. Div. 445, 42 N.Y.S.2d
746 (1943), aff'd mem., 292 N.Y. 654, 55 N.E.2d 517 (1944).
186. White v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 90, 246 N.W. 385 (1933); Dobbs, supra note 13,
at 374.
187. Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 248, 8 Cal. Rptr. 747(1960); See Kleppe v. Prawl, 181 Kan. 590, 313 P.2d 227 (1957).
188. See Dobbs, supra note 13, at 374. In White v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 90, 246 N.W.
385 (1933), the court went to great lengths to explain the concept of reasonableness in
assumption of risk:[Tioward a person fully cognizant and appreciative of a danger-a risk to which
the defendant's conduct exposes him-the defendant has no duty of taking care,
and therefore is not negligent.
When an action is brought on a tort, the defendant may say: "You mayhave been as careful as the most careful man; you may have done a thing that
many prudent men do, but you have exposed yourself, with full knowledge and ofyour own accord, to a danger which I have brought about. You have hence shown
that you agree to take your chances of this danger. I admit that this was not
careless of you. But you did assume the risk."
Id. at 93, 246 N.W. at 386.
189. Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955); Martin v. Plymouth Cordage Co.,
209 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968); cf. Petrone v. Margolis, 20 N.J. Super. 180, 89 A.2d
476 (1952).
190. Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955) (demarcation line is difficult to define);
Kaplan v. Wolff, 198 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967)(overlap); Petrone v. Margolis, 20 N.J. Super. 180, 89 A.2d 476 (App. Div. 1952) (con-
vertible terms).
191. Weber v. Eaton, 82 App. D.C. 66, 160 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Paossza, supra
note 13, § 68.
192. 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
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"primary meaning," anticipates the classic assumption of risk case where
the plaintiff is acting reasonably but nevertheless voluntarily and know-
ingly incurs a risk. An example is where a spectator or participant is
struck by a stray ball at a baseball game. The primary aspect of assump-
tion of risk operates as a denial of the defendant's negligence in that the
conduct of the plaintiff, because it is reasonable, negates any duty on
behalf of the defendant.198 Assumption of risk in this sense is a complete
bar to recovery. The other or secondary meaning of assumption of risk
anticipates that the plaintiff's conduct is unreasonable in that the ordi-
nary reasonable man would not have incurred the particular risk in light
of the potential benefit to be obtained. This secondary meaning of as-
sumption of risk closely resembles contributory negligence and may be
identical to it,'94 as in the case where one continues to use a known
dangerous instrument or remains in an automobile driven by a negligent
driver.'95 As Dean Prosser has stated:
[T]he plaintiff's conduct in encountering a known risk may be
in itself unreasonable .... If that is the case, his conduct is a
form of contributory negligence, in which the negligence consists
of making the wrong choice and voluntarily encountering a
known unreasonable risk. In such cases it is clear that the de-
fenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence over-
lap . . . with a considerable area in common, where neither
excludes the possibility of the other. 9 '
Assumption of risk in this sense is subject to the apportionment rule.
d. Policy Considerations
Quite apart from the legal distinctions between the two defenses are
the policy considerations. The disfavor in which assumption of risk is
held and the new spirit of comparative negligence militate against reten-
tion of assumption of risk as a separate defense or at least as a bar to
recovery.'9 7 An Illinois court' s considered the effect of the amendment
to the Federal Employers' Liability Act 99 (F.E.L.A.) abolishing the de-
fense of assumption of risk, and stated that the amendment reflected a
public policy decision to do away with that defense. Two Wisconsin
193. See note 188 supra and accompanying text.
194. Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943); Pona v. Boulevard
Arena, 35 N.J. Super. 148, 113 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1955).
195. Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); James, Assumption
of Risk, 61 YAL L.J. 141 (1952). Assumption of risk, in its secondary sense, seems par-
ticularly suited to cases involving "implied assumption of risk" where a passenger in an
automobile is held to have impliedly assumed the risk of riding with a negligent driver.
Springrose v. Willmore, supra; McConville v. State Farm Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113
N.W.2d 14 (1962).
196. PROSSEa, supra note 13, § 68, at 440-41 (emphasis added).
197. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 68. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 373.
198. Patznsky v. Lowden, 317 Ill. App. 613, 47 N.E.2d 338 (1943).
199. 45 U.S.C. § 34 (1970).
1974]
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cases,200 abolishing assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery in
Wisconsin, have done so basically as a matter of public policy. Further-
more several states through recent statutory enactments have abolished
assumption of risk either as a separate defense or as a complete bar.201
e. Other Jurisdictions
Those states which have the comparative negligence rule are in
disagreement over the proper status of assumption of risk. Mississippi,0 2
Georgia, 03 Arkansas,0 4 South Dakota0 5 and Nebraska 20 have retained
the defense of assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery in tort.
In Saxton v. Rose,20 7 a widow brought an action against the owner
of a truck in which the decedent was riding when he was killed and also
against the driver who was an employee of the owner. On a record indi-
cating that the driver-employee was a known habitual drunk and that he
was drunk on the night in question, the court held that the decedent
"incurred the risk" by voluntarily and knowingly submitting himself
to the risk of injury and was therefore barred from any recovery. The
court stated that contributory negligence is limited to cases where the
plaintiff has done or omitted to do something which contributes to the
legal cause of the accident, and concluded "that assumption of risk is
'venturousness' on the part of the person injured while contributory neg-
ligence is his 'carelessness'." 08
The Mississippi court probably did not consider the two aspects of
assumption of risk because it is doubtful that the decedent acted reason-
ably in taking a ride with one whom he knew to be intoxicated. Instead,
the court seemed to distinguish the defenses on the basis of deliberateness
versus lack of deliberation. Furthermore, the court confused the issue by
stating that the defendants "are not liable for the death of the deceased,
200. Bishop v. Johnson, 36 Wis. 2d 64, 152 N.W.2d 887 (1967); McConville v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962). See also Parker v. Redden, 421
S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967); Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971).
201. CoNxr. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-324 (1972); MASS. LAWS 1973, ch. 1123, formerly
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (Supp. 1973); Laws
of Utah 1973, ch. 209. But see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 11, 12 (Supp. 1973).
202. Mississippi Export R.R. v. Temple, 257 So. 2d 187 (Miss. 1972); Saxton v. Rose,
201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947). But see Watson v. Holiman, 169 Miss. 585, 153 So. 669
(1934).
203. Henry Grady Hotel Corp. v. Watts, 119 Ga. App. 251, 167 S.E.2d 205 (1969);
Wade v. Roberts, 118 Ga. App. 284, 163 S.E.2d 343 (1969); Southland Butane Gas Co. v.
Blackwell, 211 Ga. App. 665, 88 S.E.2d 6 (1955).
204. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 423
F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970). See Hass v. Kessell, 245 Ark. 361, 432 S.W.2d 842 (1968).
205. Raverty v. Goetz, 82 S.D. 192, 143 N.W.2d 859 (1966).
206. Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943); Note, 30 NEB. L. Rav.
608 (1951). See Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (1914) (construing the
F.E.L.A. before that act was amended to abolish the defense of assumption of risk).
207. 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947).
208. Id. at 823, 29 So. 2d at 649.
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Saxton, because of his own negligence in assuming the risk involved
)Y209
There is another group of states which, since adopting comparative
negligence, have refused to recognize assumption of risk as a bar. Wis-
consin and Minnesota by case decision,210 and several other states by
statute, 211 have either abolished assumption of risk altogether or have
equated it with contributory negligence for purposes of the comparative
negligence statute. Until 1962, Wisconsin held that assumption of risk
was a complete bar to recovery in tort actions and hence not subject to
its comparative negligence statute.21 2 Then in McConville v. State Farm
Insurance Co., 2 1 3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that implied assump-
tion of risk no longer would be a defense separate from contributory
negligence in automobile guest cases. 21 '4 Although the court considered
assumption of risk in its secondary sense (an unreasonable exposure to
a known hazard), the court seemed basically interested in obviating the
harsh results of the assumption of risk doctrine as a matter of public
policy 2 5 and to keep within the spirit of the comparative negligence
statute.2 16 McConville has been extended to include the master-servant
relationship, 21 7 torts arising out of violations of safe-place statutes,2 18 and
products liability cases.219
Minnesota has also abolished, at least in part, assumption of risk as
a bar to recovery in tort. However the Supreme Court of Minnesota used
209. Id. at 821, 29 So. 2d at 648 (emphasis added). Had the court considered the sec-
ondary meaning of assumption of risk, it is submitted that it would have found the de-
cedent's conduct unreasonable and, therefore, applied the comparative negligence statute.
210. Wisconsin: Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Bishop v.
Johnson, 36 Wis. 2d 64, 152 N.W.2d 887 (1967); Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120
N.W.2d 63 (1963); Colson v. Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 133 N.W.2d 21 (1962); McConville v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
Minnesota: Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
211. See note 201 supra.
212. See Baird v. Cornelius, 12 Wis. 2d 284, 107 N.W.2d 278 (1961); Knipfer v. Shaw,
210 Wis. 617, 246 N.W. 328 (1933).
213. 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
214. Id. at 378, 113 N.W.2d at 16.
215. Id. at 384, 113 N.W.2d at 19.
216. Id. at 384-85, 113 N.W.2d at 20.
217. Colson v. Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 113 N.W.2d 21 (1962).
218. Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d 63 (1963).
219. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (strict liability). See sec-
tion II, C, 5, c infra. Another reason why the Wisconsin courts have abolished assumption
of risk as a separate defense is that under its comparative negligence statute, cases would
often go to the jury on a charge of assumption of risk alone instead of on both assumption
of risk and contributory negligence instructions, so that the jury would not be given a chance
to reject assumption of risk and choose contributory negligence. Baker v. Herman Mut. Ins.
Co., 17 Wis. 2d 597, 117 N.W.2d 725 (1962). But see Cleveland v. City of Miami, 263 So.
2d 298 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Another instance where assumption of risk can create havoc is
where there is a two car accident and the passenger in one car sues both drivers but is
found to have assumed the risk of his driver's negligence. In that situation the other driver
would seem to bear the entire loss, and the passenger would recover in full. See Dobbs,
supra note 13, at 378.
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a somewhat different rationale. In Springrose v. Wilmore,220 a case factu-
ally similar to McConville, the court reversed a judgment for an automo-
bile passenger on a finding below that the passenger had implicitly
assumed the risk. The court recognized the two meanings (primary and
secondary) of assumption of risk and stated that assumption of risk,
in its primary sense, relates to the issue of whether the defendant had a
duty towards the plaintiff at all in light of the plaintiff's assumption of
risk, and that it relates to the limited duties owed to patrons of sports
events.22' With respect to the secondary meaning the court stated that:
"The doctrine of implied assumption of risk must, in our view, be recast
as an aspect of contributory negligence, meaning that the plaintiff's
assumption of risk must be not only voluntary but, under all the circum-
stances, unreasonable."'222 Wisconsin and Minnesota are representative
of the states which have abolished assumption of risk by case law and
provide explanations for such action. However, several other states by
statute have also recently abolished the defense while adopting the com-
parative negligence rule in the same statute.228
f. Florida
Although Florida has had specialized comparative negligence statutes
for quite some time,2 24 no case has been found dealing with assumption
of risk in connection with comparative negligence. This is partially the
result of the fact that the railroad statute specifically excepted assumption
of risk from its apportionment provisions 225 and the hazardous occupa-
tion statutes expressly abolished assumption of risk as a defense.226 The
possible significance which can be gleaned from the opposing views re-
flected by these statutes has been discussed elsewhere.227 Therefore, in
the absence of action by the Florida Legislature, it is necessary to look
to the Florida common law in order to find potential solutions to the
problem.
Even though the Florida courts have ostensibly distinguished between
the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence,228 there
have been some inconsistencies. 229 In Byers v. Gunn,2 10 a teenage girl
220. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
221. Id. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827. The necessary implication arising from this statement
is that primary assumption of risk should be a bar to recovery.
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. See note 201 supra.
224. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
225. Fla. Laws 1887, ch. 3744. See section II, A, 2 supra.
226. FrA. STAT. § 769.04 (1973).
227. Fisher & Wax, supra note 13, at 568-69.
228. Id. at 569.
229. Compare Fowler v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 121 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960),
udth Martin v. Plymouth Cordage Co., 209 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968), and Bartholf v.
Baker, 71 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1954).
230. 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955).
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brought an action for personal injuries she sustained when she was jolted
from the fender of a car driven by a friend. The Supreme Court of Florida
upheld the trial court's refusal to give a peremptory charge on assump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence and recognized that a distinction
existed between the two defenses:
At times the line of demarcation between contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk is exceedingly difficult to define.
A generally safe rule to follow is that the latter involves a
choice made more or less deliberately and negatives liability.
Contributory negligence, on the other hand, implies the failure
of the plaintiff to exercise due care. Some courts have stated that
assumption of risk is a mental condition of willingness, whereas
contributory negligence is more a matter of conduct.3 '
The court in Fowler v. Liquid Carbonic Corp.,3 2 followed the Byers
decision, stating that "we recognize and cleave to the distinction be-
tween the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk.' 238 The court pointed out that since the case went to the jury
on both defenses, they could have decided for the defendant on either
or both, but that the evidence warranted a finding of assumption of
risk. 34 Some eight years later, however, the same court stated that "[t]he
doctrine of assumption of risk is only an engraftment upon the well-
established law applicable to contributory negligence."2
In two relatively recent cases the Florida courts have again looked
into the differences between assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence. In one case, 1 a wrongful death action was brought against a
driver of a car carrying several teenagers involved in a one-car accident.
The plaintiff appealed from an adverse judgment alleging as error an
instruction on assumption of risk. In affirming, the court noted that
contributory negligence may consist of a failure to discover or appreciate
an unreasonable risk, or an intentional exposure to known dangers. In
the latter instance the "plaintiff's conduct may indicate his consent or
willingness to encounter the danger and relieve the defendants of re-
sponsibility, and hence the controversial defense of assumption of risk
may also be available as a defense overlapping contributory negli-
gence.) 237
In Cleveland v. City of Miami,238 the Supreme Court of Florida
231. Id. at 727. But cf. Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1218, 1226 n.16 (1962) ("A 'mental state of
willingness' is manifested only by 'conduct.'").
232. '121 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
233. Id. at 51.
234. Id. Accord, Evans v. Green, 251 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist.), cert. denied, 253 So.
2d 706 (Fla. 1971).
235. Martin v. Plymouth Cordage Co., 209 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
236. Kaplan v. Wolff, 198 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
237. Id. at 107, quoting PROSSER, supra note 13, § 64, at 434.
238. 263 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1972), quashing 250 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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quoted the Florida Standard Jury Instruction on assumption of risk" 9
and the accompanying committee note:
The committee recommends that the charge on assumption of
risk not be given as a matter of course as a second charge on
contributory negligence and that it be given only in those cases
where the jury may find that claimant 'more or less deliberately'
and willingly exposed himself to the specific risk which resulted
in his injury and damage.4 °
It seems apparent that the Florida courts have not as yet found a need
to delve into the nature of assumption of risk. Instead, they have con-
sistently held that assumption of risk, although somehow different, is an
aggravated form or an extension of contributory negligence, differing
from contributory negligence in degree only. At best, the courts have
found the distinction to be one of deliberateness as opposed to an un-
reasonable lack of deliberation.241 As the foregoing discussion has demon-
strated, this type of bare-bones analysis may prove insufficient to resolve
the application of assumption of risk to comparative negligence.
It is submitted that, at the very best, the problem of assumption of
risk is not one for the legislature. The all or nothing approach of some
legislatures242 is admittedly expedient but because of the complex dis-
tinctions between contributory negligence and assumption of risk the
problem is best left to the courts. There is little doubt that the policy
considerations and the spirit of comparative negligence amount to com-
pelling arguments for the abolition of assumption of risk as a separate
defense. However, there are cases in which there is also a public policy
argument for retaining assumption of risk, and there are indeed valid
distinctions between assumption of the risk and contributory negligence.243
If the Florida courts should adopt the distinction between primary
and secondary assumption of risk and determine that only primary as-
sumption of risk (where the plaintiff reasonably incurs a risk) shall be
a bar to recovery, then assumption of risk will remain a bar in those few
cases to which the defense is particularly suited. In the majority of auto-
mobile guest cases, however, the secondary meaning of assumption of risk
239. FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CIVIi) 3.8 (1967).
240. Id. (emphasis added). See note 221 supra and accompanying text.
241. Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955).
242. See note 201 supra.
243. Where the plaintiff acts unreasonably in making his choice, it is said that
there is merely one form of contributory negligence, . . . [blut this is a distinctive
kind of contributory negligence, in which the plaintiff knows the risk and volun-
tarily accepts it; and it has been held to differ from contributory negligence
which merely fails to discover the danger in several minor respects. Thus assumption
of risk is governed by the subjective standard of the plaintiff himself, whereas
contributory negligence is measured by the objective standard of the reasonable
man.
PRossa, supra note 13, § 68, at 456 (footnotes omitted).
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will be applied and any assumption of risk, like plaintiff's contributory
negligence, will be subject to the Hoffman rule.2 4
7. THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE
An individual's failure to wear seat belts when riding in an automobile
raises a number of medical and legal controversies.245 This is particularly
true in light of the comparative negligence doctrine.
Absent a statutory mandate246 or "special circumstances, ' 247 it is
generally held that an occupant of a vehicle is under no duty to wear
available seat belts. In those jurisdictions which so hold, failure to wear
them is inadmissible for any purpose.2 4s However, a number of jurisdic-
tions hold to the contrary. 249 For example, in Bentzler v. Braun,2 50 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that there was a common law duty to
make use of available safety belts, stating:
While we agree with those courts that have concluded that it is
not negligence per se to fail to use seat belts where the only
statutory standard is one that requires the installation of the
seat belts in the vehicle, we nevertheless conclude that there is
a duty, based on the common law standard of ordinary care, to
use available seat belts independent of any statutory mandate.25'
Even in those jurisdictions which impose a duty, the question of
causation remains. In general, since the failure to wear seat belts has
nothing to do with the occurrence of the accident, it has been held that
there is no causal connection between the failure to wear the safety
244. See Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971).
245. See Fischer, The Medical and Legal Problems Arising From the Failure to Wear
Seat Belts, 27 U. MIAi L. REV. 130 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fischer], for a compre-
hensive analysis of the legal and medical aspects involved. See also Kircher, The Seat Belt
Defense-State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1970); Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Auto-
mobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. Rlv. 288; Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1428 (1967).
246. Federal legislation and a majority of state statutes concerning seat belts have
merely required that restraints be made available in motor vehicles. There are no state stat-
utes which require their use, although a recent federal statute requires the use of seat belts
in all trucks and buses engaged in interstate commerce. In fact, some state statutes specifically
provide that failure to "buckle-up" shall not constitute contributory negligence. See Fischer,
supra note 245, at 131-32 and nn.5-16.
247. Clark v. State, 28 Conn. Supp. 398, 264 A.2d 366 (Super. Ct. 1970); Remington
v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (Super. Ct. 1969); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C.
228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968) (special circumstances arise when the occupant of an automobile
has knowledge of a specific hazard from which his seat belt would have protected him).
248. Peterson v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d
49 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Roberts v.
Bohn, 26 Ohio App. 2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53 (1971); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Ore. 52, 407 P.2d
483 (1969).
249. Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971); Truman v. Vargas,
275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149
N.W.2d 626 (1967).
250. 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
251. Id. at 385, 149 N.W.2d at 639.
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device and the injuries sustained. 252 Furthermore, evidence of failure to
"buckle-up" has been held to be inadmissible in situations where a de-
fendant wishes to take advantage of the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences or the mitigation of damages rule.253
In Florida, the failure of a party to wear available seat belts is in-
admissible for any purpose.254 However, in light of the Hoffman decision,
since a plaintiff's failure to wear seat belts would not bar his recovery,
there appears to be no policy reason why the jury should not be able to
consider this conduct, as was done in Bentzler v. Braun.
That the seat belt defense should be recognized in Florida is espe-
cially true in view of statistical findings that seat belts reduce highway
fatalities and minimize injuries,255 and in view of recent federal and state
statutes requiring that belts and harnesses be made available in all motor
vehicles.256 Admittedly, the failure to wear seat belts does not contribute
to the cause of an accident; however, it is a concurrent cause of injuries,
for in many cases an occupant of a vehicle would not have been injured
(or as severely injured) but for his failure to wear his seat belt.257 (Of
course, competent evidence is required to prove the causal connection
between the injuries sustained and the failure to "buckle-up"). 258
III. SPECIFIC PROBLEM SITUATIONS
A. Multiple Party Problems
1. INTRODUCTION
The success or failure of Florida's new comparative negligence doc-
trine could very well depend upon how the courts or the legislature decide
to handle multiple party claims. In its decision in Hoffman, the Supreme
Court of Florida seems to have "reserved ruling" in this area.
First, the court indirectly avoided the issue of how to apportion
damages (i.e., the actual steps to be taken by both judge and jury) in
252. Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); Kavanagh v. Butorac,
140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65
(1968).
253. See Fischer, supra note 245, at 143-45 and nn.89-97.
254. Pashal v. Pinkard, 228 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969); Chandler Leasing Corp.
v. Gibson, 227 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) ; Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1966).
255. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 356, 83 Cal. Rptr. 343
(1970) ; Bentzler v. Braan, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 383-88, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639-40 (1967). But see
Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Ore. 52, 407 P.2d 483 (1969) (stating that statistics indicate that
the majority of the motoring public refuses to wear seat belts).
256. See note 246 supra.
257. "The question, ... is not whether the guest's negligence contributed to the cause
of the accident but, rather, whether it contributed to the injuries." Bentzler v. Braan, 34 Wis.
2d 362, 387, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (1967). Furthermore, in Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d
40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), whether a defective automobile seat track may be the proximate
cause of injuries sustained by a person occupying the seat, was held to be a jury question,
despite the fact that the defect did not contribute to the cause of the automobile accident.
258. See note 249 sup'a.
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negligence litigation in which more than two parties were involved. The
only guidelines prescribed were for the apportionment between "plaintiff
and defendant.1 259 Thus, there was no instruction given as to a situation
involving a plaintiff suing more than one defendant, 6 ° not to mention
the more complex problem encountered when three or more parties are
all suing one another.26'
Second, the court directly declined to comment on the effect of the
decision on the Florida common law rule of no contribution between
joint tortfeasors.26 2 The District Court of Appeal, Third District, after
first noting the common law rule, has interpreted the Hoffman decision as
one that "recognized the continued existence of that rule, '26 3 despite the
fact that a plain reading of Hoffman leaves the question utterly unresolved.
Thus, Florida's comparative negligence law is at present lacking in a
very important area. The railroad statute cases264 and those under Flor-
ida's Hazardous Occupations Statute265 seemingly fail to provide any
precedent for handling multiple party cases, and the Third District has
already indicated that it will interpret inaction by the Supreme Court of
Florida as an endorsement of common law policies which were designed
for contributory rather than comparative negligence.266 It is, therefore,
the purpose of this article to propose a plan for handling such cases, to
provide sample problems for consideration, and to discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of various possible avenues available to the courts as they
fashion a "new" common law in the wake of Hoffman.207
259. The court told how to apportion between a single plaintiff and single defendant,
and how to treat a counterclaim by the defendant against that plaintiff. 280 So. 2d at
438-39.
260. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has already been asked to rule upon
a certified question as to whether to ask the jury to apportion the fault of two defendants
where the plaintiff was not himself contributorily negligent. Issen v. Lincenberg, 293 So. 2d
777 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). The district court replied in the negative.
This situation could arise in at least two ways: (a) the plaintiff's negligence could be
unquestioned by the defendants; or (b) the jury could be instructed not to apportion the
negligence of the defendants if it first failed to find the plaintiff guilty of any contributory
negligence.
261. See section III, A, 6 infra.
262. 280 So. 2d at 439.
263. Issen v. Lincenberg, 293 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
264. See section II, A supra.
265. Id. As Judge Wisdom of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recently observed in a federal multiple party case arising under Florida's Hazardous Occu-
pations Statute: "[W]e are forced to consider the proper method of computation under
Chapter 769 when there are multiple defendants to be an open question, unanswered by the
Florida courts." Orr v. United States, 486 F.2d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 1973) (decided after
Hoffman).
266. The court has retained the doctrines of joint and several liability and of no con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors. See Issen v. Lincenberg, 293 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1974) ; Rader v. Variety Children's Hosp., 293 So. 2d 778, 779 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). See also
note 270 infra.
267. Of course, as in other cloudy areas of comparative negligence discussed herein, the
door is wide open for the legislature to fashion a statutory law which will give direction
to the common law process.
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2. THE THREE ALTERNATIVES
With respect to the treatment of multiple party litigation, it seems
that there are three major choices available under comparative negligence.
The first and best plan would appear to be the adoption of what will be
known herein as the "total implementation" of pure comparative negli-
gence or, more simply, as "plan one". This, it is submitted, is the na-
tural consequence of the implementation of the two purposes stated by
the Supreme Court of Florida:
(1) To allow a jury to apportion fault as it sees fit between
negligent parties whose negligence was part of the legal and
proximate cause of any loss or injury, and
(2) To apportion the total damages resulting from the loss
or injury according to the proportionate fault of each party.26
Under the proposal set forth below for the execution of this plan, it is
suggested that in all multiple party situations, Florida can accomplish
the equitable purposes which prompted the adoption of the rule; further-
more, it can do so without having to allow contribution among joint
tortfeasors. This plan would, however, require the courts to recognize
that under pure comparative negligence, the common law doctrine of
joint and several liability has been abrogated, for otherwise one defen-
dant could, in derogation of the stated purposes, be apportioned a re-
sponsibility for satisfying damages greater than his own proportionate
share of fault.2 69
The second alternative, "plan two," would not require that joint
and several liability be eliminated, but would instead recognize the prac-
tice of contribution among joint tortfeasors. Despite the ruling of Florida's
District Court of Appeal, Third District, to the contrary,2 70 if joint and
several liability is to be retained, contribution must be permitted in order
to accomplish the objective of equating liability with fault. As will be
268. 280 So. 2d at 439 (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 41 & 42 supra.
269. See text accompanying note 268 supra. This language can be interpreted to mean
that where one of several tortfeasors is not made a "party," his negligence would not be
considered in the apportionment of fault. This proposition is discussed more fully in
section III, A, 3 infra.
Meanwhile, consider, for example, a situation in which a plaintiff's own negligence is
33% % the cause of his injuries. He joins as defendant, one of two negligent tortfeasors,
each of whom were also 33'A% responsible for causing plaintiff's injuries. Under the common
law doctrine of joint and several liability, the plaintiff could sue and collect (from only one of
the two tortfeasors) the entire 662/ % of the damages to which he would be entitled. Cf.,
e.g., Rader v. Variety Children's Hosp., 293 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), wherein, despite
the Hoffman decision, an aggrieved hospital patient was able to collect from the negligent
attending physician his entire damages, despite concurrent negligence by the hospital, against
which no contribution was permitted.
270. Rader v. Variety Children's Hosp., 293 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). No doubt,
after the pronouncements in Hoffman and in Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974),
concerning the inability of a district court to overrule the Supreme Court of Florida, the
higher court will have to take the initiative in these matters.
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illustrated in the hypothetical situations considered below,17 1 the ultimate
result under this plan would seldom differ from that accomplished under
"plan one." The main difference would be that the entire burden of joining
and/or collecting from a third party tortfeasor would rest on whichever
defendant the plaintiff chose to sue, with the plaintiff himself having no
real incentive to bring in all parties.17 2
Finally, the last alternative is to retain both joint and several liability
and the prohibition against contribution among joint tortfeasors. This
proposal is not advocated by the writers for, if adopted, it would seem
to leave unfinished Florida's attempt to adopt a more equitable system
of loss distribution. Nevertheless, its one redeeming factor is its simplic-
ity. For the same reason as the one for avoiding contribution among tort-
feasors under "plan one," there is still something to be said for 'thd
advantage of avoiding the multiplicity of litigation that could occur with
contribution; and, similarly, there may be some truth to the idea that
joint and several liability should be retained in order to discourage com-
plex, multiple party litigation.273 Nevertheless, these arguments are coun-
tered by two others. First, jurisprudentially, there is greater defensibility
to a system that attempts equity to all. Second, the practical problems
under either "plan one" or "plan two" are not so insurmountable or even
so difficult as to cost the public more than the equity of pure comparative
negligence is worth. By the use of special verdicts or interrogatories2 74
and the retention by the judiciary of the function of performing the
mathematical computations required, much of the possibility of error
can be removed from multiple party litigation. Furthermore, as will be
indicated in the ensuing subsections, the encouragement of joinder of all
parties will provide a greater likelihood of settlement (which of course ex-
pedites rather than impedes litigation) ,275 and with the special verdicts and
the joinder of all parties in one suit,276 the phantom of duplicative litiga-
271. See section III, A, 4, c infra.
272. As to the desirability of joining all parties in a single action, see note 273 infra
and accompanying text.
273. Frank E. Maloney, In the article cited most frequently by the Supreme Court of
Florida in its opinion in Hoffman, argued that in theory, joinder of all parties in one suit
is the best practice. However, he concluded that the American jury system would be more
prone to error than the English and Canadians who successfully encouraged liberal joinder.
He urged Florida to adopt comparative negligence, but not to promote joinder of all joint
and several tortfeasors, nor to adopt contribution among such tortfeasors. Maloney, supra
note 13, at 164-67; see also Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MiCtr. L. RAV. 465, 503-08
(1953).
But cf. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 381:
The importance of settling a controversy in one suit is emphasized under com-
parative negligence, because the apportionment between two parties in one suit
would not necessarily be res judicata in a second suit against a third party arising
out of the same accident, even though the third party's negligence was appropriately
figured in the first suit.
274. See note 282 infra and accompanying text.
275. HEPr & HEFT, supra note 13, § 4.200.
276. Where some parties are not willing to litigate or cannot be found or have settled
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tion fades away or is replaced by a relatively simple method of motion
practice. 77
3. THE "BEST PLAN": TOTAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PURE
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
a. The Policy and Purposes of Hoffman Require It
As stated in section III, A, 2, the policy and purposes of pure com-
parative negligence announced in Hoffman dictate a plan that, as much
as is practicable, must assign to each negligent tortfeasor liability pro-
portionate with his own degree of fault."7 In a case involving plaintiff, P,
defendant, D1, and another defendant, Ds,279 if D, is said to be "jointly
and severally liable" with Do and can be required to pay the full amount
which P may be entitled to recover (after taking into account P's own
negligence), then D, will have been inequitably treated unless he may in
turn look to Do for contribution.80
b. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Would Not be Required
Consider the following simple example :281
JURY DETERMINATION 28 2
TOTAL DAMAGES





D, owes P 20% of $10,000 or $2,000.
D, owes P 70% of $10,000 or $7,000.
P himself bears the remaining $1,000.
their claims, their negligence will still be determined in the initial suit provided certain
safeguards have been met.
277. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 367, stating that where the negligence of all tortfeasors
has been determined, one tortfeasor who has paid more than his share may obtain con-
tribution from another by motion to the court.
278. As used in this section, the word "degree" of fault will mean the percentage of
the total cause of the injury to a plaintiff which a finder of fact would ascribe to each
tortfeasor.
279. See Fisher and Wax, supra note 13, at 571 on "Multiple Parties."
280. See section HI, A, 4, infra. See also Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla.
1973) (Dekle, J., concurring).
281. The effect of counterclaims is considered infra in section III, A, 6, a.
282. This assumes a special verdict system whereby the jury's function would be kept
simple, in an effort to avoid error. The jury in this case, assuming no counterclaims had
been filed by D1 and Do, might simply be asked:
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Under the traditional concepts of joint and several liability in Flor-
ida, P could enforce against D a recovery of $9,000, the total owed to P
by both tortfeasors. Clearly, injustice to D would result from such a plan,
unless he in turn could look to D for the recovery of $7,000 in contribu-
tion, which is not allowed under traditional Florida common law. But
if P's only remedy were to collect $2,000 and no more from D, and
$7,000 and no more from D2, there would be no injustice at all.
By its decision "to allow a jury to apportion fault as it sees fit be-
tween negligent parties,12 4 it seems that the court has ruled sub silentio
that there can now only be joint and several liability where the jury would
be unable to make a logical apportionment. This follows from the fact
that the effect of the comparative negligence rule is to liberalize the estab-
lished law with respect to damages created by the concurrent acts of two
or more tortfeasors. Long ago, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
if "the damages suffered [by a plaintiff] are rendered inseparable, [the
defendants] are jointly and severally liable. ' 285 But if the jury is now
allowed to "apportion fault as it sees fit," there is no reason that the
percentage of fault cannot automatically be converted into a percentage
of the monetary damages found by the same jury to be recoverable for a
given injury. Hence, in every case, the fault and damages attributable to
each tortfeasor could be ascertained and an aggrieved party would be re-
quired to recover from each tortfeasor the damages for which each was
responsible."'
a. Did P suffer any damages? -
b. If your answer to "a" is yes, what dollar amount do you assign to these damages?
c. Was P himself negligent, that is, did he fail to act with the prudence of an
ordinary, reasonable man in fulfilling his duty to avoid injury to himself?
d. If your answer to "c" was yes, did P's negligence contribute to any damages
he may have suffered? -
e. If your answer to "d" was yes, what percentage of P's damages was caused
by P's own negligence? -%
(questions f., g. and h. would be asked with respect to D,, and questions i., j. and k. with
respect to D,, questions similar to those in c., d., and e.).
1. What part of 100% of the cause of any damages P may have suffered was
caused by:
(1) P's negligence: -41 (enter same figure as in "e")
(2) D.'s negligence: -41o (enter same figure as in "hi")
(3) D.'s negligence: -9 (enter same figure as in "k")
Total negligence: 100%
283. Reserving to the court the task of assigning the amount of money owed is,
in a simple case like this one, merely to maintain uniformity with the practice that should
be followed in a more complicated case involving damages and percentages not lending
themselves to easy mathematical computation, as well as in the majority of cases which
will find counterclaims filed by defendants against the plaintiff and each other. See note
303 and sections III, A, 3, d, (1) & (2) infra.
284. 280 So. 2d at 439.
285. Feinstone v. Allison Hosp., 106 Fla. 302, 305, 143 So. 251, 252 (1932).
286. The effect would be that single accident cases, now being apportionable, will be
treated as double accident cases were in the past, where it was said that "a jury should
apportion the damages if they can do so [in a logical and reasonable manner] but if there
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c. The Burden of Joining Third Parties Would Be Shared
Obviously, the decision to execute "total implementation" of pure
comparative negligence is a policy decision involving which party, P or
D, should bear the burden of reaching a third party such as Ds. Under
this proposal, it is submitted that appropriate rules and sanctions could
easily be promulgated to encourage both the plaintiff, P, and the defen-
dant, Di, to bring Do into the initial suit. The objective of joining all
parties in one action would minimize the number of actions burdening the
court system, and the presence of all parties before the trier of fact will
provide a better opportunity for the truth to be ascertained. Every effort
should be made to resolve a multiple party question in a single suit,2 7 and,
thus, the means for encouraging the joinder of all parties must be con-
sidered.
Looking first to the incentive of the plaintiff to join all parties,288 it
is clear from the very nature of the apportionment system that he would
desire to do so in order to obtain a complete recovery. It is therefore
suggested that very little additional incentive to the plaintiff would be
needed. It may be, however, that in the absence of the joint and several
liability of tortfeasors, some plaintiffs would avoid suing two or more
defendants for tactical reasons, expecting to join them in separate suits. 2 189
For this reason, it might be advantageous to adopt a rule that would
definitely bar subsequent litigation against one who could have been but
was not made a party to the original suit, absent proof that a good faith
effort was made for service in the initial action. 9° Conversely, by analogy
can be no apportionment then the defendant is liable for the entire damages." Washewich
v. LeFave, 248 So. 2d 670, 672 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). Comparative negligence has now
supplied the "logical and reasonable manner" in many cases where apportionment would
previously have been impossible. However, the question now raised is: What should be done
where the jury is unable to apportion damages, finding that each tortfeasor by his negli-
gence could be 1007 at fault? It may he that under such circumstances, the precedent
for "joint and several liability" should be retained. See generally Randle-Eastern Ambulance
Serv., Inc. v. Millens, (Case No. 73-523), - So. 2d - (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
287. But see note 273 supra.
288. In jurisdictions where all defendants have been jointly and severally liable to the
plaintiff, for obvious reasons a plaintiff has been disposed to sue first the one with "deep
pockets" so that once a judgment has been obtained, he could collect it. This, of course,
assumes that the party with the deepest pockets is amenable to service of process. But even
where two or more potential defendants are solvent, it is easy to see why many plaintiffs
would prefer to sue only one in order to avoid the consequences at trial of having two or
more adverse parties subjecting their witnesses to cross examination, making objections, and
otherwise complicating his case.
289. See note 288 supra. There is some hardship to the trial lawyer who must contend
with the objections, cross-examinations and other confusion engendered by multiple counsel.
290. There is ample precedent in Florida under constructive service of process cases
for an adequate definition of a "good faith effort." Furthermore, "long-arm statutes" now
make many more defendants amenable to service of process than ever before. Very few
persons who have property or a job are able to disappear and avoid service of process
by a diligent plaintiff. Those who can disappear are frequently insolvents, whose joinder
may make very little difference. Thus, the situations involving insolvent and nonjoinable
tortfeasors are similarly treated. See text of section III, A, 3, d injra.
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to section 2-607(5) (a) of the Uniform Commercial Code, it may be that
Florida could make one who is notified of an action against him but re-
fuses to come in and defend, bound to accept whatever judgment may
be rendered against him.29
A defendant can likewise be encouraged to join third parties by
appealing to his selfish interests, and the one likely to be of most effect will
be his desire to diminish his own fault in the eyes of the jury by pleading
as an affirmative defense the negligence of a third party. Just as in the
proposal for encouraging joinder by a plaintiff, it would be a simple
matter to require proof by a defendant of a "good faith effort"2 2 to join
a non-party before permitting him to raise that non-party's negligence
as an affirmative defense. However, before rules encouraging joinder
can be useful, the basic rule allowing third party practice needs to be
amended. As suggested by Justice Dekle in his concurring opinion in
Ward v. Ochoa,298 a change will be needed in rule 1.180 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, since that rule currently allows a defendant to
bring in a third party only when such party "is or may be liable to him
[the defendant] for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him."
Of course, if the proposal that the objectives of Hoffman be fully
implemented gains acceptance, defendants will no longer be jointly and
severally liable. And even if they were, in the absence of the adoption
of a rule allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors, it could never be
said that one defendant would be liable to the other for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him. Therefore, the joinder rule would need to
be liberalized to allow one defendant to bring in another defendant even
though the latter may not be liable to the former.294
d. Three Solutions to the Insolvent Third Party Problem
(1) An Extension of the "Total Implementation of
Pure Comparative Negligence"
Where a defendant is amenable to service of process, but turns out
to be insolvent or execution-proof after a judgment is rendered against
291. While this idea may also be analogized to the federal rules regarding consolida-
tion of multi-district litigation, due to the differences between the state and federal systems,
conflict of laws and full faith and credit problems may arise which, of course, the federal
courts need not face.
292. See note 291 suPra.
293. 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973). As stated by Justice Delte:
In the present posture of the matter, for equal justice on a comparative basis,
any involved party should be brought into the matter in such position as he actually
appears, and the limitation on our own Florida third party practice which stands
in the way of this should be revamped accordingly. To continue without this com-
pletion of the change over to comparative negligence, is to allow what was a
well-intended joint tortfeasor rule to be used unfairly as a tool to avoid complete
justice. The objective is to have a full and fair evaluation by the jury of the extent
of each party's actual liability.
Id. at 388 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
294. Of course, in a multiple party situation, it may be expected that one defendant
would be liable to the other on an Independent claim arising out of the same incident.
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him, the situation could be handled in the same manner as that where a
defendant is not joinable. Under "plan one" this would mean that the
plaintiff would be called upon to bear the loss occasioned by such an
event. This method would be the most theoretically consistent with the
purposes of Hoffman already discussed, and is defensible as a practical
matter on three bases. First, as suggested by Justice Dekle, there is no
longer any reason to maintain the rule against dividing liability among
joint tortfeasors since "in most instances tortfeasors are financially reli-
able through insurance coverage."295 Second, there is no more reason that
one should be insured against liability for that portion of an injury to a
plaintiff that is not attributable to his own negligence than that a plaintiff
himself should insure against the eventuality of an uninsured tortfeasor.
This is particularly true in light of Florida's no-fault and uninsured motor
vehicle coverage. 290 Finally, as will be discussed in subsection III, A, 6
infra, where D has stated a counterclaim against P, the effect will often
be to average out the amount of loss suffered by either D1 or P, regardless
of which of them is left to bear the burden for a non-joinable or execution-
proof D. 297 In addition to the foregoing, it may also be noted that in
any event the contributorily negligent plaintiff, who can only recover a
part of his damages from one of two or more defendants, is still more
equitably treated under pure comparative negligence than under contrib-
utory negligence where he would have been completely barred from re-
covery, regardless of his damages.98
(2) The "Compromise" Plan
Despite the appeal of the argument for theoretical purity, there is
a reluctance expressed by many writers to permit the burden of loss
occasioned by an insolvent or nonjoinable tortfeasor to fall entirely upon
a "plaintiff" when there is a solvent defendant tortfeasor available.299
It has been little noted that under pure comparative negligence, the mere
fact that one party is a "plaintiff" does not necessarily mean he is less at
fault than one sued by him as a "defendant." However, some sympathy
seems to automatically attach to these labels. The consensus of those who
29S. Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla. 1973). Florida's Financial Responsibility
Laws now require proof of liability insurance in order to have a vehicle inspected. Of course,
not all multiple party negligence actions involve automobile accidents but more and more
individuals, as well as most corporate entities, are now carrying liability coverage.
296. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.727, .730-.741 (1973).
297. See also Dobbs, supra note 13, at 369-70.
298. See note 305 infra. Under this proposal, admittedly, there would be instances where
one tortfeasor might be completely absolved of liability at the expense of another. It is
submitted that in terms of the simplicity and efficiency gained thereby, and considering
the relatively small number of times this would occur, the price would not be too great to
pay.
299. See, e.g., Maloney, supra note 13, at 168, with respect to "the socially undesirable
feature of placing more of the burden of loss on an injured party who is usually in the
poorest position to bear it."
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have recently considered the issue of who, under comparative negligence,
should bear the burden of the nonjoinable or insolvent tortfeasor, seems
to be that there is need for a compromise. 00 Therefore, it has been pro-
posed as a reasonable alternative to placing all the burden on either the
plaintiff or defendant, that the plaintiff's and defendant's negligence be
directly compared by the court after the jury has apportioned damages
and fault among all tortfeasors.30 1
The "compromise" is simply illustrated using the same hypothetical
figures as in section III, A, 3, b supra. Assuming that Ds was insolvent or
unavailable and that P was able to satisfy the court of this fact either
before or after judgment was initially rendered, 8 2 the court would re-
compute the liability of D1 as follows:30 Whereas P, Di, and Ds were orig-
300. GREGORY, LEGisA Loss DisTmunoK nr NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS ch. XIV (1936).
Gregory's plan or one similar to it has been cited with approval, inter aia, by several au-
thorities. See, e.g., Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence, 1941 Wis. L Rxv. 289,
297; Fisher and Wax, supra note 13, at 571; Leflar, Walker and Bethel, supra note 13, at
92; Maloney, supra note 13, at 168; and Schwartz, supra note 13.
301. This, of course, assumes in the case of a non-joinable defendant, DR, that the joined
defendant, D1, is not barred from pleading D.'s negligence (as discussed in the text accom-
panying note 292 supra).
302. The proponents of this plan have not specified when the court would have to deter-
mine the necessity of implementing it. It is assumed that as to an unavailable party, this
would be evident from the pleading stage. See text accompanying note 292 supra. As to the
insolvent tortfeasor, in an extreme case his financial condition will be evidenced by his lack
of representation at trial. However, it may not appear that he is execution-proof until the
plaintiff has attempted to execute on a judgment against him. In such cases, it is submitted
that a party should not be penalized for failure to have undertaken the prejudgment expense
of proving DR's financial condition. Rather, he should be permitted to invoke "the com-
promise" by a post-trial motion for amendment of judgment under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530
and within the one year time limit of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b). Such information could
either be treated as "newly discovered evidence" within the meaning of that rule or a
separate exception could be made by amending the rule.
303. In the event of a counterclaim by D. against P, the liability of P would similarly
be re-computed. See section III, A, 6, a infra. As will be illustrated by the following example,
it is always advantageous for D, to counterclaim against P and/or cross-claim against DR
where possible, particularly where DR is either execution-proof or not amenable to process.
Part "a" below assumes the same hypothetical situation as in the text accompanying note
282 supra; "b" is also the same except that DR is insolvent or non-joinable; "c" is the same
as in "b" except that D, has suffered $9,000 damages and has filed a counterclaim against P
for that amount (he would also have filed a cross-claim against DR, but that is not figured
in the computation since DR is execution-proof).
a. Judge's Determination
D. owes P 20% of $10,000 or $2,000
DR owes P 70% of $10,000 or $7,000
P bears 10% of $10,000 or $1,000 of his own loss.
b. Judge's Determination Amended Where D, Insolvent [see also accompanying
text].
D, owes P 662/3 % of $10,000 or $6,666.67 rather than $2,000 as in "a".
P bears 33% % of $10,000 or $3,333.33 rather than $1,000 as in "a".
c. Judge's Determination same as above but with Counterclaim
P owes D1 33y3% of $9,000 or $3,000 rather than $900 (10% of $9,000 if DR not
insolvent).
D1 bears 663/3% of $9,000 or $6,000 rather than $1,800 (20% of $9,000 if DR
not insolvent).
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inally found respectively to be 10%, 20% and 70% negligent, with D,
owing P only 20% of his $10,000 damages, the negligence of P will be
directly compared to that of D, and found to be in the ratio of 10 to 20.
Hence, under the compromise, judgment will be rendered as if P were
33 1/3% negligent and D. were 66 2/3% negligently at fault. Therefore,
the judge's determination would be:
D1 owes P 66 2/3% of $10,000 or $6,666.67, rather than $2,000.
P himself bears the loss of $3,333.33 instead of only $1,000.
Clearly, the burden is thereby distributed according to the proportionate
degrees of negligence of P and Di, and thus is an "acceptable" compro-
mise.8 °4 Such a plan should meet with no resistance from those who fear
to overburden a plaintiff who has been wronged, since in those instances
where a jury finds the plaintiff to be without contributory negligence, the
application of the "compromise" rule would result in D, paying 100%
of that which he and Do would have owed.805
Nevertheless, there may be those who would object to the compro-
mise solely on the basis that regardless of how seldom it may occur, an
insolvent or nonjoinable Da might be absolved from the possibility of
being reached at some future date by those who have suffered at his ex-
pense. While it has already been noted that insurance should protect P
and perhaps D, to some extent, and expediency would encourage the
adoption of a policy that would finalize proceedings after one initial court
action, it should be observed that the "compromise" plan need not fail
due to disagreement on this minor point. As suggested earlier by analogy
to section 2-607(5) (a) of the Uniform Commercial Code, a Do who had
been notified and given opportunity to defend but refused to do so could
be bound to accept any determination of fact made against him in that
proceeding. And certainly, with or without that refinement, as against
such a defendant, a separate action in his home jurisdiction could
always be undertaken in the absence of a bar thereto. As to either an in-
solvent party (who subsequently may come into money) or a party non-
Set-off: P owes D1 $3,000 rather than $900
D. owes P $6,666.67 rather than $2,000
Net: D, owes P $3,666.67 rather than $1100
304. The compromise, however, has not been "acceptable" to the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin. See note 306 infra and accompanying text.
305. The result is the same as if the rule of joint and several liability were applied
under the contributory negligence doctrine where, in theory only, no plaintiff ever recovered
if he were contributorily negligent. It is thought that under comparative negligence, the jury
will not be tempted to "wink" at a plaintiff's negligence. Yet situations may exist where
the plaintiff may truly be without fault. In some cases, under the "compromise" he will be
entitled to full recovery from the solvent tortfeasor as under the "deep pockets" rule. E.g.,
where P = 0% negligent, D. = 20% negligent, and D. = 80% negligent, but D. is insolvent
or unavailable, direct comparison of the negligence of P and of D1 indicates 0 to 20 which
Is a mathematical impossibility and results in D1 being 100% responsible, the same result as
under the joint and several liability rule.
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joinable for jurisdictional reasons (who is found in a subsequent suit),
a prevailing P or D1 could be made to share equitably with the other party
to the compromise any net recovery made by him.
(3) The Status Quo: Retention of Joint and Several Liability
Without Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Although the pure form's total implementation has been resisted, it
would seem that the "compromise" related above would be welcome in
any comparative negligence jurisdiction. However, such is not the case.
Wisconsin, the leading comparative negligence state, has persisted
in casting the entire burden of the insolvency or unavailability of a third
party tortfeasor on the defendant, Di.'06 In that state, the concept of
joint and several liability has been retained. However, this rule is made
less harsh by two refinements thereto: (1) Wisconsin has a "modified
50%" form of comparative negligence, so that if P's negligence is greater
than that of D1, P can recover nothing from Di;80 7 and, (2) if D, does
have to pay D2's obligation to P, D, is entitled to contribution under a
rule which utilizes the "pure form," 08 allowing contribution even from
an insolvent Do who may even have been less negligent than Di.
Nevertheless, the Wisconsin rule has been the subject of criticism
for allowing the plaintiff "to pursue either or both joint tortfeasors for
the recovery of the damages due him without regard to the collectibility
of the joint tortfeasors as between each other."5°9 And, as noted in the
preceding section, the majority of recent commentators have rejected
the Wisconsin idea and advocated the "compromise" of comparing di-
rectly the negligence of solvent parties and thus distributing losses be-
tween them. In any event, no one seems to consider the retention of the
current Florida status quo--joint and several liability without contribu-
tion-as a viable alternative.8 10
306. Walker and Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934);
Chille v. Howell, 34 Wis. 2d 491, 149 N.W. 2d 600 (1967) (citing and re-affirming the
Walker rule). Dean Prosser, in drafting the statute by which Arkansas adopted "pure"
comparative negligence in 1955, is said to have intended the Walker rule to be followed.
It was adopted despite arguments in favor of a "compromise" plan. Dobbs, supra note 13,
at 368-69.
307. Thus, if the negligence of P, D1 and D. were apportioned at 20%, 10%, and 70%,
respectively, and D. was insolvent P could recover nothing. On the other hand, if P were
10% negligent, D1 were 20%, and D. 70%, with D. again insolvent, P could recover from
D1 for the liability of both D1 and D,. D, would then have a claim in contribution against
D,. The inequity here is in the fact that it is unlikely D. will ever collect from D.. Further-
more, while uninsured motor vehicle coverage is commonly purchased by one to protect
himself, it may be contended by an insurance company that such coverage would not con-
template the insolvency of a contribution defendant.
308. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) (adopting the rule).
See Section III, A, 4 infra.
309. HEFT & HEFT, supra note 13, § 1.350, at 64.
310. But cf. Issen v. Lincenberg, 293 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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4. THE "SECOND BEST" PLAN: CONTRIBUTION AMONG
JOINT TORTFEASORS
Florida, though having the rule of joint and several liability among
tortfeasors, does not as of this writing permit one joint tortfeasor who
has "borne an unequal proportion of the common burden"', he shares
with another to exact contribution from that other. 12 For this situation
to be changed, it appears that either Florida's Supreme Court or its legis-
lature will have to take affirmative action.
813
This section is devoted to the consideration of the viability and
desirability of taking such an affirmative step (which is only suggested
in the event the state is not prepared for the "full implementation of
comparative negligence" called for under "plan one"). In addition, it is
intended to call attention to certain of the possible repercussions on
existing Florida law which should be taken into account before the adop-
tion of any plan permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors.
a. Why Allow Contribution?
The most compelling reason for allowing contribution among joint
tortfeasors is its fairness. It makes good legal sense that if B and C to-
gether owe A $100, and if B pays the entire $100 to A, he in turn should
be able to ask C to contribute his "proportionate share." ' 4 The equity of
this rule has ample precedent in Florida contract law,81 5 and there would
seem to be a very rational basis for its extension to the law of torts, espe-
cially under a comparative negligence rule whose object is the equation
of liability with fault. 1 6 In fact, a type of indemnity often referred to by
the court as "contribution" has already been applied in Florida for over
forty years as between certain joint tortfeasors who were distinguished
from one another as not being "in pari delicto," simply because the neg-
ligence of one was categorized as "active" and that of the other as
311. HEFT & HEFT, supra note 13, § 1.300, at 51. The three essential elements required
for contribution among tortfeasors have been stated as follows:
(1) two or more parties must be joint negligent wrongdoers;
(2) two or more parties must have common liability because of the negligence;
(3) one party must have borne an unequal proportion of the common burden.
Id. (emphasis added).
312. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143
So. 316 (1932); Rader v. Variety Children's Hosp., 293 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
313. See notes 269 & 270 supra.
314. What a "proportionate share" would be is the subject of discussion under section
III, A, 4, c infra, entitled "Implementation of Contribution Should Be Pure."
315. Meckler v. Weiss, 80 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1955) (co-obligors of a debt where neither
had the "prior duty of performance"); Epstein v. Drusin, 249 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1971); McMahon v. Weesner, 254 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1966). But cf., Lopez v. Lopez,
90 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956) (no contribution where tenant by entireties has succeeded decedent
husband as sole obligor).
316. "To apportion the total damages ...according to the proportionate fault of each
party" was one of the purposes of adopting comparative negligence. 280 So. 2d at 439.
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"passive. 31 7 It is now only reasonable in the spirit of Hoffman v. Jones
that if joint and several liability is retained, making it possible for one
tortfeasor to be liable to pay for the negligence of another, that contribu-
tion should be allowed in order to distribute their liability according to
their proportionate fault.
Nevertheless, there has been some reluctance on the part of Florida
courts to "embark upon such a perilous journey" as would be occasioned
by their recognition of contribution.8 1 The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, has indicated that it hesitates to do so not only because
the supreme court refrained from so doing in Hoffman, but also because
they "find no adequate reason is brought forward for the abrogation of
this rule of long standing."31 9 The District Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
trict, has concurred, citing the Third District decisions with approval.8 20
If a jurisprudential argument is needed, it would seem that the ob-
jective of equating liability with fault, as discussed above, would satisfy
the court.82' As to the more practical objection that contribution may
result in a burden to the courts, it is submitted first that this alone is
never a sufficient reason for perpetuating injustice, and second, that the
practice of requiring special verdicts by which the percentage of liability
of all parties would be determined by the jury in a single action could per-
mit the procedural burden of contribution to be reduced to mere motion
practice. 22
b. How Does "Plan Two" (Contribution) Differ
From "Plan One"?
In result, it is submitted that contribution would be almost as equi-
table a route to travel as the full implementation of pure comparative
317. The line of cases which purport to allow "contribution among joint tortfeasors"
where the negligence of one is "active" and the other "passive" seems to stem from a
confusion between "contribution" and "indemnity." Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist.
Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (Fla. 1932) (a case of master-servant in-
demnity).
Subsequent cases interpreted Seaboard to distinguish between "active" and "passive"
negligence of parties where negligence of one is imputed to the other due to contract.
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1963); Fidelity & Cas. Co.
v. T. P. Herndon & Co., 196 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); Stembler v. Smith, 242
So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970) (no contribution where negligence of both tortfeasors was
"active").
318. See Rader v. Variety Children's Hosp., 293 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), dis-
cussed in notes 269 & 270 supra.
319. Id. But cf. Orr v. United States, 486 F.2d 270, 278 (5th Cir. 1973), where the
Fifth Circuit in essence posed the converse question of whether Florida could still be re-
taining its longstanding rule of joint and several liability without contribution after the
decision in Hoffman.
320. Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
321. See Orr v. United States, 486 F.2d 270, 278 n.11 (5th Cir. 1973), quoting Hoffman,
280 So. 2d at 438: "A primary function of a court is to see that legal conflicts are equitably
resolved. In the field of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever be reached by a
court is the equation of liability with fault."
322. See notes 278 & 282 supra; cf. note 274 supra.
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negligence from the outset of a multiple party case. 23 In fact, from the
standpoint of "purity" of loss distribution, it differs little, if at all,
provided "pure" comparative negligence is applied in contribution pro-
ceedings.2'4 The principal distinction would be in the policy determi-
nation of who should bear the loss engendered by an insolvent or non-
joinable tortfeasor.8 25
In the discussion of "plan one," it was submitted that the principles
of Hoffman required that each tortfeasor be responsible for only that
amount of injury caused by his own proportionate share of the fault.826
Therefore, it was urged that joint and several liability be abrogated and
that, in effect, separate judgments be rendered in favor of a plaintiff
against each defendant for only so much of the plaintiff's damages as that
defendant had caused. The clear implication in a situation where one of
two tortfeasors was insolvent or not joinable in the action was that the
plaintiff would be forced to absorb the loss with the possibility of a later
recovery if he had made a good faith effort at joinder. In the alternative, 27
a "compromise" was outlined whereby the percentages of negligence of
the plaintiff and the joined defendant could be directly compared. Under
that plan, the loss occasioned by the third tortfeasor's absence or in-
solvency would be shared according to the relative negligence of the other
two. Furthermore, there would be "encouragement" to both the plaintiff
and the defendant to seek out and join other tortfeasors, 2s as the interests
of both would be served by their presence or at least by the right to have
their negligence considered by the finder of fact.
In contrast, under the plan allowing contribution among joint tort-
feasors, the burden of loss occasioned by the insolvent or unavailable
tortfeasor can be made to fall upon any one defendant who is both solvent
and available. This is true since each tortfeasor is "jointly and severally
liable" with each other tortfeasor for all the damages to the plaintiff ex-
cept those found to have been attributable to the plaintiff's own contribu-
tory negligence. Thus, after having been called upon to pay Dq's portion
of the damages as well as his own, D1 is left with the burden of trying to
collect contribution from an elusive or insolvent D2. As has been observed
by a Wisconsin commentator, letting the plaintiff "pursue either or both
joint tortfeasors for recovery of all his collectible damages without regard
to the collectibility of the joint tortfeasors as between each other" is
something with which critics can "rightly find fault." 2 9
Aside from the shift from the plaintiff to the defendant of the burden
for a third party's presence or collectibility, the other major difference
323. See note 273 supra.
324. See section III, A, 4, c infra.
325. See text accompanying note 272 supra.
326. See section III, A, 3, a supra.
327. See section I1, A, 3, d, (2) supra.
328. See section III, A, 3, c supra.
329. Em & HEFr, supra note 13 § 1.350, at 64; see text accompanying note 311 supra.
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between contribution and "plan one" seems to be in the added complica-
tion of a second action for contribution. In Wisconsin, for example, the
enforcement of the right to contribution requires the contribution plaintiff
to plead and prove four elements:
(1) His own negligence;
(2) negligence of the joint tortfeasor;
(3) that the settlement made by the paying wrongdoer was
fair and reasonable; and
(4) that the liability is common liability.8 0
This pleading and proof could be largely a matter of res judicata or
collateral estoppel in a suit against a contribution defendant whose negli-
gence was determined in the initial action. However, it appears that such
a preliminary computation as this need not be a prerequisite to contribu-
tion, unless specifically made so, and thus the possibility of a multiplicity
of law suits could become a real one. While there may be some merit to
an argument that the initial suit between the plaintiff and the defendant
who would later become the contribution plaintiff could be less compli-
cated if the negligence of other tortfeasors were not considered by the
trier of fact, it is obvious that if contribution is to be allowed, the second
suit's increased complexity would ultimately outweigh the advantage of
a simpler initial proceeding. 31 For that reason, the same argument is
made under contribution as under "plan one," that the joinder of all tort-
feasors should be encouraged in the initial suit. Then, if all parties were
to be joined or to have their negligence initially determined, in light of
the consequent simplicity of the second suit, the decision whether to
adopt "plan one" or contribution as a method of insuring the fulfillment
of the objectives of Hoffman would again be reduced to the policy decision
of whom to burden with the ultimate responsibility of collecting from the
nonjoinable or execution-proof party.
c. Computation Under Contribution
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that joint and several liability
is to be retained and contribution is to be permitted, the question that
immediately arises is: How will contribution be computed?
Historically, there is a basis for the method of "pro rata" contribution
among tortfeasors which is still followed in admiralty actions in the
United States,"' and, according to Prosser, would be considered the
general rule in most states having contribution. 83 Under that school of
330. HEFr & HnrT, supra note 13, § 1.330, at 59.
331. See Maloney, supra note 13, at 167 n.196, for Maloney's statement, without sup-
porting argument, that contribution in Florida is unnecessary.
332. Maloney, supra note 13, at 152-53 dting Turk, Comparative Negligence on the
March, 28 Cm-KzEN L. Rxv. 189 231-38 & n.95 (1950).
333. PRossE, supra note 13 § 50, at 309. It should be noted that none of the states
cited by Prosser for this proposition were comparative negligence states.
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thought each tortfeasor is required to share equally in the payment of
damages sustained by the plaintiff in the initial action. Thus, if plaintiff,
P, 10% negligent and having $10,000 in damages, sues defendant, D1,
20% negligent, and defendant, D2, 70% negligent, P may recover from
D1 the entire $9,000 to which he is entitled after deducting the 10%
caused by his own negligence. However, when D, seeks contribution from
D2, instead of recovering $7,000 (70% of $10,000), he recovers only
$4,500 because the two tortfeasors share the loss equally. The inequity
to D, is apparent. However, the redeeming social feature to this plan is
its simplicity in the contribution suit, which may be the reason it was
retained by the writers of the current Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act.834
The "equal division" rule stated above was followed by England
inter alia, until the Maritime Convention Act of 1911, which adopted an
apportionment according to the fault principle.e" Since Florida has chosen
a plan of pure comparative negligence based upon apportionment accord-
ing to fault, it would make little sense for the state to choose any form
of apportionment among contribution parties which would prove less
equitable than its comparative negligence rule. Wisconsin has already
proven the unworkability of attempting to utilize the equal division sys-
tem in a comparative negligence state,8 6 and has adopted a "pure form" of
comparative negligence to be applied in contribution actions even though
it still retains a "modified" comparative negligence doctrine as between
the original plaintiff and defendant(s) 11 37 For this reason, if Florida
adopts a pure form of contribution to go with its comparative negligence
doctrine, Wisconsin contribution cases since 1962 can provide an excel-
lent source of persuasive authority.
In altering its method of apportionment in contribution, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin noted four "devices of procedure and practice" util-
ized in their state which made contribution according to the proportionate
percentages of causal negligence "pragmatically sound as well as real-
istically just.""' As delineated by one analyst, these were:
1. Use of the special verdict
2. Ability to join directly automobile insurance carriers
3. Permission for pleading of contribution
4. Fixing of a percentage of the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence (in the initial suit).,3 9
334. 9 UNIFoRM LAWS Amw. § 1(b), at 68 (Supp. 1961).
335. Maloney, supra note 13, at 152-53.
336. Wisconsin adopted contribution by judicial decision in Ellis v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918). It is the only comparative negligence state to
do so other than by statute. HFr & HE r, supra note 13, § 1.310, at 52.
337. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
338. Id. at 8, 114 N.W.2d at 108.
339. Hsrr & Hzr, supro note 13 § 1.310, at 54.
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Since Florida already permits direct action against liability insurers,840
and under Hoffman also has a discretionary form of the first factor and
a mandatory form of the fourth, all that remains is to permit defendants
to plead contribution in their answers and thus have the percentages of
negligence of all tortfeasors assuredly fixed in the initial action.3 4'
As to steps in computing contribution, there seem to be two leading
ways suggested for a jurisdiction intending to utilize the comparative
negligence of the joint tortfeasors in distributing the burden of liability
between them.8 42 The first would initially compute the diminished dam-
ages of the plaintiff (that is, reduce his total damages to the amount
which he is entitled to recover after consideration of his own contributory
negligence, if any); then after one tortfeasor had paid the "diminished
damages" to the plaintiff, ratable apportionment of that amount would be
made according to the ratio of the contribution parties' percentages of
negligence. This is illustrated by the following example:
Total Diminished Obligation
Party Negligence Damages Damages to Pay
P 10% $10,000 $9,000 $1,000
DA 30% $ 0 $ 0 $3,000
Do 60% $ 0 $ 0 $6,000
Assuming D paid P $9,000, D could then seek contribution from Do
for 60/90 of $9,000, or $6,000 under the ratable apportionment rule.
The second method of computation would simplify the above pro-
cedure by looking strictly to the original "obligation to pay" calculated
directly by using only the contribution defendant's percentage of damages
multiplied by the original plaintiff's damages. This second method would
closely approximate the "total implementation of pure comparative neg-
ligence" as advocated in section III, A, 3 supra, with the exception that
there would be joint and several liability and the burden of an insolvent
Do would fall upon Di, rather than P. Do's obligation to D, would be
computed by multiplying $10,000 by 0.60, rather than multipling $9,000
by 60/90.
Obviously, the method whereby the "diminished damages" are cal-
culated first and used as the basis for contribution obtains the same result,
but it is submitted that for the sake of mathematical simplicity the second
340. Beta Eta House Corp., v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970); Shingleton v.
Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
341. The authors concur with the recommendation of Dobbs that special verdicts by
which the negligence of all parties would be fixed should be made mandatory in multiple
party actions. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 367. Pleading contribution could be a type of third
party practice for joining contribution defendants, the need for which has been discussed in
note 293 supra and accompanying text.
342. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 367.
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method is preferable. This is more readily apparent where all three tort-
feasors, P, D, and Do, are suing each other, with D, and Do counter-
claiming and crossclaiming against P and each other, respectively, and
particularly if the jury fails to find the damages of each party to equal
some easily divisible number, or if it finds percentages of negligence
which do not combine to form fractional ratios.
Assume, for example, that P's damages were $10,808, and that the
respective percentages of negligence were 17%, 44%, and 39%. Though
the computation is by no means simple, it is far less burdensome to
multiply the total $10,808 by 0.39 to arrive at Do's obligation to reimburse
D1, than to multiply 39/44 times the diminished damages computed by
multiplying $10,808 by 0.17, and subtracting the product from $10,808.
Therefore, the 100% fractional method is recommended for uniform use.
Again, it will be important that special verdicts be used in the initial
action so that the exact percentages and figures will be available for con-
tribution purposes. The increased complication of counterclaims, cross-
claims, and set-offs will be considered in section III, A, 6 infra, but it
consists, essentially, of performing the same operation outlined above, for
each plaintiff, counter-plaintiff, and cross-plaintiff, and then setting off
the amounts owed by all parties to each other.
d. Interrelationship of Contribution
and Other Aspects of Florida Law
Adopting a rule allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors, like
adopting a rule allowing pure comparative negligence, cannot be accom-
plished in a vacuum. Just as there were certain areas of Florida law on
which the Hoffman court felt compelled to rule (such as the doctrines of
last clear chance and gross, willful and wanton negligence), 4 contribu-
tion, if adopted will have its repercussions. In particular, the effect of
contribution and the counter-effect on it will be considered herein with
respect to two basic areas: (1) the doctrine of assumption of risk and
other doctrines incompatible with common liability, and (2) the role of
settlements, including the practice of effecting releases.
(1) Contribution and the Doctrine of Assumption of Risk and
Other Doctrines Incompatible with Common Liability
(a) The Common Liability Requirement
Traditionally, the right to obtain contribution is held only by a joint
tortfeasor. 44 As Prosser has noted, the distinction between contribution
343. There are, of course, other areas about which the court will ultimately have to
make a decision, not the least of which Is the doctrine of assumption of risk. See section
II, C, 6 supra.
344. HuT & HePT. supra note 13 § 1.320, at 56.
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and indemnity is that contribution is a distribution of loss (as among
equals), while indemnity is the shifting of an entire loss from one who has
paid to another who has not paid, but on whom the law or a contract has
imposed the greater duty to pay.3 45 In order for contribution to be ap-
plicable, there must first exist what the law refers to as common liability.
Whether or not common liability exists between two tortfeasors is deter-
mined as of the time of an accident's occurrence;346 for one tortfeasor
to be liable for contribution, the contribution defendant must have been
originally liable to the initial plaintiff and have had no special immunity
with respect to him. 47 Thus, his liability must have been 'common" with
that of the paying tortfeasor who has become the contribution plaintiff, 4 '
and who paid more than his fair share of the damages claimed by the
plaintiff in the initial tort action.
(b) Assumption of Risk
Consequently, where the initial tort action plaintiff has assumed the
risk of the negligence of one tortfeasor (such as the host driver in whose
car he was riding), 19 there can be no contribution obtained from that
host driver by another tortfeasor driver, because no common liability ever
existed. In fact, under assumption of risk, the host driver would never
have been liable at all to the initial plaintiff. Clearly, this ramification
should be considered in deciding whether or not to retain the doctrine of
assumption of risk.350
Assuming that assumption of risk is found worthy of retention, the
decision whether to adopt contribution takes on a new dimension. Under
"plan one" above, where a defendant is liable only for that amount of
damage for which he is causally responsible, the fact that another de-
fendant tortfeasor is immune from suit would result in no injustice to
the first defendant at all. Conversely, under contribution, with the re-
tention of joint and several liability, one joint tortfeasor may definitely
suffer injustice. Putting the question of assumption of risk in the "plan
one" perspective, with the plaintiff bearing the burden of immunity en-
gendered by his "assumption of the risk," allows a more objective con-
sideration of the merits of retaining or rejecting the assumption of risk
doctrine than is possible under the contribution situation where the de-
fendant bears that entire burden.8 51
345. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 308-10.
346. HErT & Harr, supra note 13 § 1.320, at 56.
347. PRossER, supra note 13, at 309.
348. The right of contribution is said to be "inchoate" until payment is made
by one sharing common liability with another such that the first has paid more than
his proportionate share. Equity causes the ripening of the right because the non-
paying party has been unjustly enriched.
Harr & HEPr, supra note 13 § 1.320, at 55.
349. Shrofe v. Rural Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 258 Wis. 128, 45 N.W.2d 76 (1950).
350. For a discussion of this question, see section II, C, 6 supra.
351. See note 355 infra and accompanying text. As considered In section ITT, A, 3, d
supra, the plaintiff may be In a better position to bear the burden than a defendant.
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(c) Other Areas Affected by the Common
Liability Requirement
The effect of allowing contribution among tortfeasors has also been
considered in conjunction with situations involving governmental or inter-
spousal immunities, liability by statute, workmen's compensation liability,
gross negligence and wrongful death actions. In each of these areas, a
reassessment is valuable in light of the possible adoption of contribution
among tortfeasors in this state.
In each of the above areas, some courts maintain that there is a lack
of common liability between the "ordinarily negligent" tortfeasor and a
member of the class of tortfeasors affected thereby. The governmental
and inter-spousal immunities are self-explanatory, in that one who is not
liable because of immunity clearly does not share "common liability" with
another. Furthermore, it has also been held, in Wisconsin, for example,
that where liability for negligence is imposed by statute (such as in the
case of the imputed negligence of a minor to the one signing for his
driver's license, or the case of an employer's workmen's compensation
liability being statutorily prescribed),332 there is no common liability with
one found liable under the normal rules of negligence. 33 Similarly, one
found guilty of "gross negligence" would not share common liability with
one guilty of "ordinary negligence," and beneficiaries entitled to sue
under a wrongful death statute do not share common liability (or any
liability) for the torts of a decedent in whose name they are permitted
to sue.
The idea that these disparities should be continued after a state's
adoption of pure comparative negligence has come under attack by one
well known legal writer. Dan Byron Dobbs, noting that the rationale of
some courts was to prohibit contribution where there was a lack of "com-
mon liability," while others simply cited "public policy" in support of a
particular immunity, has aptly observed:
While [allowing certain immunities] made good sense when the
plaintiff was entitled to recover only if he was free from negli-
gence, it does not make such good sense to place all liability on
one negligent defendant while letting a negligent plaintiff recover
without suffering himself a share of [the] third party's im-
munity.85
The writers of this article concur. Furthermore, as Dobbs also pro-
posed, in the case where one tortfeasor is liable because the negligence of
another is imputed to him, under pure comparative negligence he should
352. By statute, Florida has prescribed that a negligent employer who pays workmen's
compensation to his injured employee is not liable to a joint tortfeasor sued by the employee
for a separate recovery on the same injury. FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1973). See also section II,
C, 3 supra.
353. HaP & Hmr, supra note 13 § 1.320, at 56.
354. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 368.
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stand completely in the shoes of the one for whom he is responsible, and
thus be susceptible to a suit for contribution. 55 Likewise, it would appear
that a beneficiary in a wrongful death action should also be imputed
the negligence of the deceased for whose death he is seeking recovery,
so that the computation of the damages recoverable by that beneficiary
in a pure comparative negligence state will be proportionately reduced
by that negligence, in the same way that any actual negligence on the
part of the beneficiary himself in causing the decedent's death should
reduce his recovery.
In conclusion, as a general rule of thumb, it is proposed that the
"new" common law respecting negligence in Florida should be shaped
in such a way that the exceptions are few. For the reason stated by Dobbs,
the courts are urged to avoid adopting immunities or artificial distinctions
which would hinder the operation of "pure" comparative negligence.
More specifically, in a day when statutory liability, imputed negligence,
strict liability, negligence per se and other doctrines are imposing liability,
there is no reason why Florida, if adopting contribution among tortfeasor
should also adopt the doctrine of common liability.8 50
(2) The Effect of a Prior Settlement and Release on Contribution
(a) Usage in Other Jurisdictions
It is generally conceded that compromise and settlement are favored
creatures of the courts, in that settlement tends to reduce the burden on
the court system. Consequently, the effect on settlement had by com-
parative negligence and its contemplated refinements such as contribution
among tortfeasors is an important consideration for Florida lawmakers.
The general rule, according to Prosser,857 has been that a party who
settles with a plaintiff and in return receives either a release or a covenant
not to sue is not relieved from the duty of contribution in states which
permit joint tortfeasors to recover from one another under that doctrine.
Clearly, such a rule is not conducive to settlement, since its effect is to
leave a settling party in a position where it still must defend against a
contribution claim. Therefore, the opposite position was taken by the new
355. For example, suppose S, the servant of M, is jointly liable with T, another tort-
feasor, for the injury to P, a plaintiff. Where joint and several liability is recognized, after
obtaining a verdict whereby T is found 40% responsible and S 60% responsible for the
injury, P may choose to recover his entire damages from T. It is, therefore, submitted that
T should be entitled to contribution from either S or M, assuming M would be properly
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Of course, M in turn could seek indemnity
from S for so much as M may pay to T in contribution (or to P, if joined in the original
suit).
356. There is no redeeming social policy reason for including these complications in an
already complicated area of law. Comparative negligence should simplify rather than com-
plicate, and all those whom the law makes "liable" for negligence should be subject to
"comparative liability" with the negligence of another.
357. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 309. See the original UNrwoP.s CONTRIaBuON AxONO
ToRTAsoRs AcT, 9 UNvoRm LAws ANNOTATED 1 4 (1939).
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Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which prescribes a total
and absolute discharge to such a settling defendant.85 This rule certainly
provides incentive to settle, but it leaves open the question of the equity
of allowing one joint tortfeasor to make a fast deal with the plaintiff at
the expense of another joint tortfeasor who is thereby left to bear the
brunt of the litigation. 5 9
As may be expected, since rules espousing two opposite extremes
have existed, there is also a compromise rule in effect in certain juris-
dictions. For example, the New Jersey rule provides for a pro rata reduc-
tion of the amount remaining due, 60 an idea which Prosser claims is
criticized as tending more to discourage than to encourage settlement.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin elected to adopt a
rule allowing contribution according to percentage of fault and predicted
that "substantially more settlements will result."8 6' The ensuing procedure
for settlement in Wisconsin, where contribution is of the "pure form"
comparative negligence variety, 62 could provide an excellent example for
Florida to follow.
The ultimate result of settlement in Wisconsin seems to be that (1)
the plaintiff and defendant negotiate and arrive at an estimated percentage
of fault which is likely to be assessed against the defendant; (2) this is
converted to a dollar amount for the purposes of settlement; (3) a re-
lease or covenant not to sue is drawn up whereby the settling tortfeasor
is discharged for "that percentage of negligence found attributable to the
settling tortfeasor"; 86 and, (4) the release or covenant also contains a
provision whereby the settling defendant does not lose his right to con-
tribution but is protected against contribution being obtained by another.
It is easily understood why the Wisconsin trial bar was "appre-
hensive that proper releases could not be drawn under Bielski v. Schulze
(the leading case) which would preserve rights of contribution against
the nonsettling tortfeasor.1864 Nevertheless, this was accomplished by a
method prescribed by the Wisconsin court:"[T]he plaintiff must agree,
to satisfy such percentage of the judgment he ultimately recovers as the
settling tortfeasor's causal negligence is determined to be of all the causal
negligence of all the co-tort-feasors.8 8 5 In other words, when the settling
tortfeasor's negligence is ultimately determined, the release puts him in
the same position as if he had paid the exact amount of damages required
358. UNIFORM CONTRInUTiox AmONO TORTIEASORs ACT, 9 UNiFoRM LAWS ANNOTATED
§ 1(b) at 68 (Supp. 1961). PROSSER, supra note 13, at 310 indicates that the reason for
the new "total discharge" rule was to encourage settlement.
359. Cf. Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973), discussed infra in text accompany-
ing note 373.
360. Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 129 (1965).
361. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 114 N.W.2d 105, 111 (1962).
362. Id.
363. HErr & HEFT, supra note 13 § 4.200, at 10.
364. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962); HEFr & HEFT, supra note 13 § 4.220, at 13.
365. Bielskt v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 114 N.W.2d 105, 111 (1962).
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of him, whether it turns out that he settled for more or less than the
amount which would have been assessed at trial.8 66 No problem is pre-
sented by the fact that settling tortfeasors are not present at trial, since
"both plaintiff and defendant are entitled to have the percentage of the
nonsettling tortfeasor's negligence determined."367
(b) Florida Law on the Subject
Florida, long before adopting comparative negligence, passed legis-
lation governing releases and covenants not to sue.86 " Among other things
provided by the Florida statute are the following rules: (1) a release as
to one party does not discharge any other party; (2) a release in return
for a partial satisfaction of a plaintiff's claim results in a set-off reducing
the damages awarded in a judgment against a party not released; and,
(3) the existence of a release is not to be made known to the jury. All
of the above appear to be completely consistent with the objects of com-
parative negligence set forth in Hofman. In fact, Dean Maloney, in his
1958 article advocating comparative negligence in Florida, actually argued
that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act not be adopted
here partly because the Florida legislature had already accomplished one
of the goals of the Act by enacting legislation allowing release and settle-
ment against one party without releasing others.869
The set-off aspect of the Florida statute is also compatible with
comparative negligence, and would seem to fit nicely into the adoption
of either the plan for total implementation of comparative negligence ad-
vocated herein or a Wisconsin-style plan for contribution and settle-
ments. 70 It will be remembered that under "plan one" there would be no
joint and several liability and therefore there would be no need for any
set-offs (since any defendant who had not settled would be held re-
sponsible only for the percentage of damages caused by his own negli-
gence). Under the Wisconsin plan for contribution discussed above, the
types of releases prescribed are tantamount to enforcing a set-off such
that the other defendants are not liable for that part of the fault ascribed
to a settling defendant.871 It should be noted that their operation is
366. See HEFT & HEFT, supra note 13, § 4.200 and appendix III for discussion of re-
leases and recommended forms to be followed.
367. HFFT & HEFT, supra note 13 § 4.220, at 16, citing Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d
182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
It is here again made apparent that the special verdict is a necessary partner in the
venture of comparative negligence. Therefore, Florida trial judges are urged to submit to
requests and even, sua sponte, require the use of special verdicts in all negligence cases,
so that whatever system and refinements are chosen, they can be accurately studied for their
effectiveness. See section III, A, 5, infra.
368. FLA. STAT. § 768.041 (1973).
369. Maloney, supra note 13, at 167 n.196.
370. For a construction of FLA. STAT. § 768.041 (1973) as to uninsured motorist cover-
age and a resistance to contribution among tortfeasors, see Nearhoof v. International Sales-
Rentals Leasing Co., 251 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
371. See discussion in HmFT & HEPT, supra note 13, § 4.220, at 15.
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couched in terms of allowing the nonsettling, jointly liable tortfeasor to
be liable for all the damages not yet paid, then to have the plaintiff
indemnify the settling tortfeasor against any contribution he may be re-
quired to pay (in the event he had obtained a favorable settlement by
paying initially less than the amount for which the verdict ultimately
made him responsible).
One relatively recent judicial creation effecting the Florida law re-
garding release and settlement should also be considered for the sake of
completeness. The "Mary Carter agreement '372 is a device whereby one
co-defendant secretly contracts with the plaintiff that he will go to trial
and defend himself, while at the same time the plaintiff agrees to release
the co-defendant from all but a certain amount of liability mutually
agreed upon. It is self-evident that in a comparative negligence state
a certain amount of tactical advantage could inure to a plaintiff if a
settling joint tortfeasor would remain in the case and testify in such a way
as to diminish the plaintiff's liability in the eyes of the jury, as well as to
inculpate the non-settling tortfeasors. For this reason, even in a case not
involving comparative negligence, the Florida Supreme Court has held
that it is reversible error for a trial judge to refuse to order any Mary
Carter agreements to be produced for discovery and to admit them into
evidence upon proper introduction at trial.187 The court did not view a
set-off under Florida Statutes section 768.041(2) (1973) of the amount
settled upon in the release to be curative of the error or to render the
failure to admit the existence of a Mary Carter agreement before a jury
to be harmless error. Thus, it should be noted that while the ordinary
settlement and release whereby the settling tortfeasor bows out of litiga-
tion is governed by section 768.041(3) and shall not be made known to
the jury, if a Mary Carter is entered into and the settling party is to
remain in litigation, its existence must be disclosed.
In his concurring opinion in Ward v. Ochoa, the case just described,
Justice Dekle rightly ascertained that underlying the whole Mary Carter
question was the serious question of whether the court should reconsider
the rule against contribution among joint torfeasors. It seems clear that
reconsideration must occur, as has been urged in prior subsections of this
article. But regardless of whether Florida adopts "plan one" or "plan two"
for accomplishing Justice Dekle's stated purpose of " 'equal justice' on
a comparative basis," the decision in Ward is a good one, particularly
for a comparative negligence state.
5. THE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIAL VERDICTS
It has been a recurring theme of this article that with the adoption
of comparative negligence, there is a definite need for the systematic use
372. Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
373. Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973). This case is noted in 28 U. MunM
L. REv. 988 (1974).
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of special verdicts.3 74 While William Schwartz found authority for the
propositions that special verdicts destroy the value of the jury as an
instrument for translating the law into "the answer from the man in the
street," and that the special verdict device is one that complicates court
room procedure,875 the authors of this article concur with those who be-
lieve that special verdicts are both necessary for the sake of equity and
practical in their implementation.
Two reasons are advanced in urging that special verdicts not only
be made optional, as announced in Hoffman,8 78 but also be made uni-
formly mandatory, either by legislation or judicial decree. First, in order
to effectuate many facets of a plan for the optimum use of pure com-
parative negligence, the device is almost a prerequisite. And, second,
since Florida is in the rare position of consciously embarking on a new
excursion into the formulation of the common law of negligence, it has
an equally rare opportunity to provide from the outset a means of moni-
toring its experiment. In short, the special verdict will enable review by
the judiciary, the legislature and by legal scholars which will reveal much
more fully the reactions of juries under the new system.
As to the practical need for special verdicts, it should be recalled
that throughout the discussion of multiple party problems, it has been
readily apparent that room for purely mathematical error is always a
possibility. Consequently, the special verdict is advisable both because
(1) it may be used in such a way as to put the mathematical computa-
tions in the hands of the judge rather than the jury; and (2) it provides
a means for appellate review of such computations, by whomever made.
And even in situations which do not involve multiple parties, it should be
recognized that the comparative negligence system's goal of truly appor-
tioning liability according to fault may be better realized by using the
special verdict. As Maloney observed: The special verdict will "protect
a defendant from an overly sympathetic jury.'8 77 More specifically,
[a] jury which on general principles would return a large verdict
in favor of a pretty woman and against a railroad company [not
to mention an insurance company sued under Florida's direct
action provisions] may well hesitate to return special findings
which it knows to be against the evidence. 78
Maloney has further pointed out, even at the writing of his article
which was relied upon so heavily by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Hoffman, that Wisconsin's comparative negligence law has been regarded
as successful, and Mississippi's has been the subject of criticism, mainly
374. See notes 274, 282, 303, 341 & 367 supra and accompanying text.
375. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 131-35.
376. 280 So. 2d at 439.
377. Maloney, supra note 13, at 171.
378. Maloney, supra note 13, at 172, citing Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mica.
L. REV. 465, 502 (1953).
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because Wisconsin has a required special verdict procedure, whereas
Mississippi has not. 79
In addition, the special verdict can scarcely be denied usage if three
other problem areas under comparative negligence are to be successfully
and efficiently resolved. First, in the area of the insolvent or non-joinable
third party, it has been observed that special findings are needed in order
to preserve properly a finding of negligence in such a way as to permit
any later action against such party without the need for relitigating the
issue of negligence. 8 ° Similarly, in the event that this state adopts a rule
allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors, the special verdict has
again been cited as a critical part of the solution to avoiding the relitiga-
tion of negligence in a subsequent action for contribution.88' Finally, with
reference to the promotion of settlements and releases, the special verdict
would again be a necessity in computing the negligence to be ascribed to
the settling as well as the nonsettling parties.882
Prosser observed three main reasons for the adoption of special
verdicts in conjunction with the adoption of comparative negligence: (1)
it allows for the correction of jury error (a remittitur may save a new
trial); (2) it forces detailed consideration by the jury rather than allow-
ing it to jump to a conclusion on a "gut reaction"; and (3) it enables
the court to avoid the necessity of using long, complicated jury instruc-
tions which would open the door to reversible error . 88
One further consideration remains, however. One of the most per-
suasive criticisms of the Wisconsin special verdict system has been that
it is unduly complicated and cumbersome. Although the authors favor
special verdicts, there is no reason why the Wisconsin system need be
adopted. Instead, the "federal rule special verdict"884 may be used. It
consists of a general verdict accompanied by written interrogatories, a
device not altogether new to Florida. 85 Finally, the intricacy of the ver-
dict may be reduced to a minimum by including blanks on the general
verdict form for total damages sustained by each party, the degree of
fault attributable to each party and the reduced damages, which are
the total damages multiplied by the percentage of fault.886
In view of the above outlined approach, it appears that the most
prudent course of action for Florida judges is the immediate uniform
adoption of special verdicts in comparative negligence actions.
379. Maloney, supra note 13, at 172. See, e.g., Ghiardi & Hogan, supra note 13, Ap-
pendix II; HEFT & HErP, supra note 13, Appendix III for sample special vedicts.
380. See note 303 supra.
381. See note 341 supra and Dobbs, supra note 13, at 367.
382. See note 367 supra.
383. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 91 MICH. L. Rav. 465, 502 (1953).
384. FED. R. CIv. P. 49(b).
385. FIA. R. Civ. P. 1.481. "In all actions when punitive damages are sought, the verdict
shall state the amount of punitive damages separately from the amounts of other damages
awarded."
386. See note 282 supra. For an example of the simplified special verdict, see Acevedo
v. Acosta, 296 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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6. THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT: INCREASED COMPLEXITY WITH
ADDITIONAL PARTIES
a. Counterclaims, Crossclaims and Set-offs
(1) The Multiplier
While the Supreme Court of Florida in Hoffman prescribed a means
for computing the liabilities of parties in a two-party situation,8 87 it
failed to do so in those situations involving more than two parties;
therefore, the procedure to be used in such instances requires a certain
amount of extrapolation and imagination. Three alternative plans have
been proposed as solutions to this problem.8
For the purposes of the discussion below, it will be assumed that
either "plan one" or "plan two" as described earlier will be adopted,
thus permitting the true proportionate distribution of fault among all
parties, even in multiple party situations.
The decision to adopt comparative negligence, if it is to be a mean-
ingful one in multiple party situations, will of necessity result in an in-
crease in the complexity of multiple party litigation. If the doctrine of
joint and several liability is to be considered abolished, 889 or if, in the
alternative, contribution among tortfeasors is to be permitted, then a
plaintiff will no longer be able to satisfy his damages by joining a single
tortfeasor, Di, if a second tortfeasor, D2, also contributed to his harm. 90
The multiplied complication becomes evident with the addition of suc-
cessively increasing numbers of tortfeasors, particularly in light of the
fact that with the abolition of the complete bar formerly imposed by
contributory negligence, each "defendant" who has himself sustained
damages can now in good faith become a counter- or cross-plaintiff.
While the Hoffman decision provided for the eventuality of two negligent
parties suing each other and each being entitled to recover, the proposed
solution of setting off their liabilities is not so simple a matter when
three or more parties bring suits against one another. The following ex-
amples will be illustrative of a procedure which, if followed, may prove
to be a satisfactory method of computation in such a situation. 91
(2) Examples
The following are examples demonstrating in a three-party situation
the division of labor and methods for judge and jury: (1) the jury's duty
387. See section III, A, 1 supra.
388. Section III, A, 2 supra and succeeding sections discuss the alternatives of the
"Total Implementation of Pure Comparative Negligence," the use of contribution among
joint tortfeasors, and the possibility of retaining the status quo rule of joint and several
liability without adopting contribution.
389. See note 293 supra.
390. This is true even under the contribution alternative suggested in section III, A, 4
supra, since a defendant, D 1, would be constrained to join the other tortfeasor, D 2 , in order
to have the negligence of all parties determined in a single trial.
391. See also notes 282, 303 & 342 supra and accompanying text for other examples.
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will be to compute each party's negligence, the total damages of each, and
the net recovery to which each is entitled after taking into account his
contributory negligence; (2) the judge's function will be to compute the
individual recoveries and to effect the set-offs. Assume that P, the initial
plaintiff, sued D, and Da for P's $10,000 damages suffered in an auto-
mobile accident, and that D1 and De each counterclaimed against P and
cross-claimed against each other for their own $10,000 and $50,000 re-












(2) JUDGE'S DETERMINATION (possible methods)
(a) P's Recovery under Each Method 39 3
1. Preferred Method3 94
a. D1 owes P 20% of $10,000
(total) = $2,000.
b. D. owes P 70% of $10,00
(total) = $7,000.
2. Diminished Damages Method
a. D. owes P 20/90 of $9,000
(diminished) = $2,000.
b. D. owes P 70/90 of $9,000
(diminished) = $7,000.
(b) D.'s Recovery under Each Method
1. Preferred Method
a. P owes D1 10% of $10,000
= $1,000.
b. DO owes D1 70% of $10,000
= $7,000.
2. Diminished Damages Method
a. P owes D1 10/80 of $8,000
= $1,000.
b. D. owes D1 70/80 of $8,000
= $7,000.
(c) D.'s Recovery under Each Method
1. Preferred Method
a. P owes D. 10% of $50,000
= $5,000.
b. D1 owes D8 20% of $50,000
= $10,000.
2. Diminished Damages Method
a. P owes D. 10/30 of $15,000
= $5,000.
b. Di owes D. 20/30 of $15,000
= $10,000.
(d) The Set-Off3 95
a. Between P and D1 , P recovers a net of $1,000.
b. Between P and D2 , P recovers a net of $2,000.
c. Between D1 and D., D. recovers a net of $3,000.
392. Diminished damages (sometimes referred to as "recoverable damages") are com-
puted by reducing the claimant's total damages by the proportion of his damages caused by
his own contributory negligence.
393. Of course, in actual practice two methods would not have to be used, although
the two do provide a "check" on each other for correctness.
394. The "preferred method" is first illustrated in note 282 supra. Its use avoids the
extra steps involved in the "diminished damages" method, and is also mathematically simpler.
See "plan one" as advocated in section III, A, 3 supra.
395. As to the advisability of denying to insurance companies the benefit of set-offs,




The reader should notice that as between P and D1, each of whom
sustained the same amount of damages, the one who was less negligent
recovered the net set-off. However, as between D1 and Do; although Di's
percentage of negligence was less than one third as great as Do's, Do won
a modest net set-off from D1. This result is indicative of the role played
by the damages sustained by the parties under pure comparative negli-
gence. In a "modified" rule state, such as Wisconsin, Do would have been
barred from recovering against D in any capacity other than as a con-
tribution plaintiff. However, under Wisconsin's pure form contribution
(in the wake of the Bielski decision), Do could have recovered contribu-
tion from D1 .396
Two other points should be evident. First, if the jury were to find
the percentages of negligence to be less easily used in multiplication and
division, and if it also found the damages of the parties to be in "odd"
numbers, as illustrated in section III, A, 4, c supra, the "preferred"
method would be a simpler and, thus, superior method of computation.""
Second, it should be obvious that with such "odd" numbers, and with
the addition of other parties, the problem of set-off would be much better
left in the hands of the judge than in those of the jury.
b. Tendency Toward Settlement
Considering the complexity of multiple party litigation under com-
parative negligence, it may be tempting for Florida lawmakers to sacrifice
purity of result in favor of the retention of the rule favoring joint and
several liability and opposing contribution among joint tortfeasors 9
However, only a small part of the total number of accidents giving rise
to negligence actions involves multiple parties, who have all sustained
injuries. Furthermore, it appears that of those accidents which do fall
-,into the multiple party category, seldom are more than three parties
involved. It is submitted that under the plans proposed in this article
for the division of functions between judge and jury, the difficulty of
handling such cases will not be too great.
Nevertheless, there is also a favorable psychological and economic
phenomenon which should help to persuade lawmakers of the value of
permitting a pure form apportionment of fault among multiple parties:
the more complex the case, the greater the incentive for the parties to
settle. Dean Prosser observed this phenomenon in an article written in
1953.899 He found "astonishingly few cases in which the question of mul-
tiple parties [had] reached the appellate courts under any 'comparative
negligence' act." 400 He finally concluded that the cases of multiple parties
396. See note 337 supra and accompanying text.
397. See text following that which accompanies note 342 supra.
398. See section I1, A, 2 supra for a discussion of the merits of this alternative.
399. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REv. 465, 507 (1953).
400. Id. at 507.
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
were either "sufficiently few in number, or... disposed of with so little
difficulty in the trial courts, that they [had] not been a major problem
on appeal." 40'1
Furthermore, this phenomenon has been found to be a reality in
Wisconsin. It has been said that the fact that all parties under the Wis-
consin plan can be joined in one action has been a definite factor en-
couraging settlement.4 2 This has already been advocated in this article
as a wise plan for Florida to follow. 40 3 There is no reason to believe that
the effect on settlements will not be the same in this state as in Wisconsin.
Thus, liberal joinder rules in Florida should be encouraged.
B. Insurance Ramifications
1. IN GENERAL
In our post-industrial revolution society, any change in tort law or
any new tort doctrine will have insurance consequences. This is especially
true of the comparative negligence doctrine, in that it has been promoted
as an alternative to "no-fault" insurance.40 4 The overall effect of the com-
parative negligence rule on insurance is probably impossible to fathom
and is definitely beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, only a few
representative areas in which insurance and comparative negligence inter-
sect will be examined.
2. THE SET-OFF PROBLEM
a. The Problem Defined
The most perplexing comparative negligence problem concerning
insurance is whether the insurance carrier should be subjected to the
set-off principle.405 In a two-party action, for instance, the question is
whether an insurer must pay claims based on the two individual verdicts,
or whether it should be responsible only for the net (set-off) judgment.
This problem has been the subject of extensive debate among the com-
mentators406 and has even prompted statutory action.407 The Arkansas
401. Id. at 508. Prosser finally decided that he would leave multiple party apportion-
ment, "theoretically perfect as it may be," to the Canadians "until the American jury is [sic]
eliminated or at least improved." The proper use of special verdicts by Florida trial courts
should control the jury problem feared by Prosser.
402. H 'rT & HEr, supra note 13 § 4.200, at 9.
403. See section III, A, 4, d (2) (a) supra on settlements.
404. Krause, No-Fault's Alternative-The Case for Comparative Negligence and Com-
pulsory Arbitration in New York, 44 N.Y.S.B.J. 535 (1972). If comparative negligence is
indeed an alternative to no-fault insurance, there seems to be little justification for having both.
405. The Hoffman decision expressly requires that when two verdicts (one for each
litigant) are returned, the court must off-set one against the other and render one judgment
reflecting the net amount. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
406. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 383; Fisher & Wax, supra note 13, at 570; Flynn, Com-
parative Negligence: The Debate, 8 TRIAL 49, 52 (1972); Leflar, Walker & Bethell, supra
note 13; Leflar & Wolfe, supra note 13; Schwartz, supra note 13, at 126.
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legislature went so far as to abandon the pure form rule4 8 altogether,
in an apparent attempt to avoid the problem.409
However, the authors have found no reported cases dealing with
the issue, which tends to indicate that in a pure form state like Mississippi
there must be no real problem. Due to the absence of actual appellate
cases, an illustrative example will be set out below, accompanied by a
discussion of the legal and policy considerations involved, and, hopefully,
a beneficial suggestion.
b. An Illustrative Example
The following example is taken from an actual case, litigated in
Arkansas, which was apparently never appealed but which became the
subject of a panel discussion between a legal scholar and a judge.410
Two insurance companies are the litigants. One is insisting that
there should be a set-off and the other is insisting that there
should not be. The facts stated briefly are about as follows: A
man driving a car had a collision insurance policy with one
insurance carrier and liability insurance with another insurance
company. He was involved in an accident, and his collision
carrier reimbursed him and then sued the other driver for sub-
rogation. The other driver promptly counterclaimed for both
property damages and personal injuries. At the trial the counter-
claimant received a verdict for personal injuries that exceeded
the verdict which the plaintiff was given on his property dam-
age. The attorneys presented to the court a precedent for a
judgment wherein the liability carrier was given the benefit of
the plaintiff's verdict for property damage as a set-off to the
personal injuries. Now, the collision carrier says, "You got the
money that we are entitled to. We are subrogated to those rights,
and we want our money back." So... the collision carrier [is]
now suing the liability carrier to recover the amount of the set-
off.... [T]he defendant liability carrier has demurred to the
complaint, arguing that the plaintiff stands only in the position
of its insured, and, since they have extinguished their liability
to the insured, he has no right against them and neither, there-
fore, has the collision insurance carrier. 411
These sources contain several excellent examples and represent some of the best analysis
of the problems involved.
407. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1972) (prohibiting casualty insurers from
taking advantages of the set-off). It should be noted, however, that the casualty insurers
benefit from the prohibition at the expense of liability insurers (see text accompanying note
410 infra) and, therefore, the legislature ought to have addressed itself to whether the
prohibition also applies to the liability insurer. See notes 411-416 infra and accompanying text.
408. The set-off problem only arises in jurisdictions having the pure form rule and the
modified-50% rule because under the other forms, there can be only one recovery and,
hence, no set-off. Fisher & Wax, supra note 13, at 570. See note 19 supra.
409. No. 296, [19571 Ark. Acts 874; Fisher & Wax, supra note 13, at 570.
410. Leflar & Wolfe, supra note 13, at 72.
411. This example can be diagrammed in the following manner:
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The liability insurer wants to be subjected to the set-off in order to
incur liability for the lesser "net" judgment, rather than for the gross
verdict amount. It argues that its policy provisions require it to pay "all
sums to which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay" and that
since the judgment (as opposed to the verdicts) is the "legal" obligation
to pay, it should only pay the net amount reflected in the judgment.412
Furthermore, it asserts that the policy usually gives the insurer all de-
fenses available to the named defendant so that it should be able to plead
set-off as a defense.1 Under this theory, it is obvious that the liability
insurer would then pay a relatively smaller portion of the total damages
involved, as compared to what it would be obligated to pay without the
set-off.4"4 Consequently, with the set-off, the individual insureds are sub-
jected to much greater individual liability. In light of the widespread use
of collision insurance however, the insureds may nevertheless be fully
compensated.
The collision carrier wants no part of the set-off inasmuch as it
would diminish most subrogation claims and seriously jeopardize small
(1) Assume that A is the claimant and B is the counterclaimant and that A is 60% at
fault and sustained $10,000 damages, whereas B is 40% at fault and sustains $10,000 damages.
(2) The individual verdicts are computed as follows:
B owes A 40% of $10,000 or $4,000
A owes B 60% of $10,000 or $6,000
(3) The set-off is computed as follows:
B owes A $4,000
A owes B $6,000
A owes B $2,000
(4) The above illustrate the result where no insurance is present. Assuming that
both A and B are insured and that each has separate collision and liability insurers (for
ease of explanation), the monetary differences caused by permitting both types of insurer
to take advantage of the set-off, on one hand, and prohibiting them therefrom, on the
other, can be illustrated as follows-
Where insurers are subject to set-off Where insurers are not subject to set-off
A's collision insurance pays A $10,000 and A's collision insurance pay A $10,000 and has
has no subrogation claim against B a subrogation claim of $4,000 against B
A's liability insurance pays B $2,000 (B's net A's liability insurance pays B $6,000 (B's pre-
judgment against A) set-off verdict against A)
B's collision insurance pays B $10,000 and B's collision insurance pays B $10,000 and
has a $2,000 subrogation claim against A has a $6,000 subrogation claim against A
B's liability insurance pays A zero (since B B's liability insurance pays A $4,000 (A's pre-
received the net judgment) set-off verdict against B)
When the two alternatives are compared it is readily apparent that the liability insurers
benefit greatly from the set-off. (e.g., if the insurers are subjected to the set-off, A's liability
insurer would pay B $2,000 instead of $6,000, and B's liability insurer would pay A nothing
instead of $4,000). On the other hand, the collision carriers' subrogation rights have been
diminished by the set-off (e.g., A's collision insurer has no right of subrogation against B
as opposed to a $4,000 subrogation claim where there is no set-off, and B's collision insurer
has a $2,000 subrogation claim against B as opposed to one for $6,000 where there is no
set-off). Therefore, the set-off enables the liability insurer to pay a lesser amount while
at the same time it diminishes the collision carriers' subrogation claims.
412. Fisher & Wax, supra note 13, at 570; Leflar & Wolfe, supra note 13, at 72-73.
413. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 383.
414. See note 411, supra.
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subrogation claims. x5 Since the collision carrier has no greater right
against the other party (or his insurer) than does its insured, its subro-
gation claim would be diminished or even cancelled by the set-off
process.4 1 6
c. No Clear-Cut Solution
The commentators generally favor excluding insurers from the set-
off process,4 17 although most admit that there is no clear answer,418 and
most agree that regardless of the position taken with respect to insurers,
individual litigants should always be afforded the set-off.4 19 Furthermore,
it has been stated that the set-off would tend to eliminate small subroga-
tion claims,420 but that "this would not necessarily be an undesirable
result." 42
1
The ultimate question is whether it makes any difference how the
issue is resolved. If, in automobile accident cases, both parties are fully
insured (have liability and collision coverage) then it would probably
make no difference at all. However, if one or both parties do not carry
collision coverage, then the party or parties would not be adequately pro-
tected by insurance and the insurers would receive a tremendous benefit
from the set-off. This consideration alone may be sufficient to tip the scale
in favor of no set-off for insurers.
All in all, the policy considerations favor the no set-off for insurers
argument and, as stated previously, this is the position taken by the
majority of commentators. 22 However, ruling is reserved until one final
factor is programmed into the insurer set-off decision. The potential con-
flict of interest problem which arises in the set-off for insurers context
must also be considered.
3. POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATIONS
a. Conflict Concerning Set-off
The first of two potential conflict of interest situations directly con-
cerns the set-off problem discussed above. The typical insurance policy
affords control of the conduct of the defense to the insurer and the in-
surer's attorney, who usually represents the interests of both the insurer
and the insured. Clearly, the insured may wish to assert his own great
amount of damages and low degree of negligence in a counterclaim, as
415. It is noteworthy, however, that often a liability insurer is also the collision carrier,
in which case, as to it, the monetary difference may be insignificant. Leflar, Walker & Bethell,
supra note 13, at 93.
416. See note 411, supra.
417. Leflar, Walker & Betbell, supra note 13, at 93; Schwartz, supra note 13, at 125-26.
418. Leflar & Wolfe, supra note 13, at 72.
419. See note 406 supra.
420. Dobbs, supra note 13, at 383.
421. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 127.
422. See note 406 supra.
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well as the high degree of negligence of the other party. However, there
is obviously no monetary incentive for the insurer to prove high damages
and low negligence on the part of its insured if the insurer is not per-
mitted to reap the benefit of any set-off, for if the liability insurer must
pay the total damages caused by its insured, it has no interest in vigorously
asserting the negligence of the other party. On the other hand, if the
insurer is subjected to the set-off, it will endeavor to prove high damages
and low negligence on the part of its insured in order to decrease its po-
tential liability. Thus the insured would benefit directly from his insurer's
endeavors, especially in those instances where the judgment is likely to be
in excess of policy limits and, at the other extreme, in those cases where
his recovery on the counterclaim may engender a net recovery in his
favor.423
The significance of this conflict of interest is lessened considerably
by two factors. First, in those cases where the potential conflict arises,
the insured can (and should) retain independent counsel to protect his
interests. Secondly, even though there may be no direct monetary incen-
tive for the insurer to prove high damages and low negligence if the
insurer is not subjected to the set-off, it is submitted that the attorney,
who represents both insurer and insured, will nevertheless be required
to protect the insured's interests as a matter of professional obligation.
Finally, in the event that the insurer attempts to restrain the attorney
from going "all out" in defense of the insured (or fails to cooperate in
some manner) the attorney would have an ethical duty to recommend
independent counsel.
Although this potential conflict of interest has been cited as a reason
why insurers should be subjected to the set-off,4 24 in light of the fore-
going it is submitted that its effect on the set-off issue is not of itself
enough to warrant allowing the insurers to benefit from the set-off at the
expense of the public.
In the final analysis, the policy question raised is whether to put the
motoring public in the position of having to obtain collision coverage in
order to protect themselves from their own comparative contributory
negligence. The upper middle class citizen generally does so; thus, the
real issue is whether the liability insurer, who has the benefit of compul-
sory insurance legislation requiring all Florida drivers to purchase its
protection, should be required to insure fully the risks of its insured's
liability against the driver not adequately covered by collision insurance.
The authors suggest that this question be answered in the affirmative.
b. Conflict of Interest in Settlement
It is well-recognized in Florida law that a liability insurer, having
the right to control litigation, has a duty to exercise good faith toward
423. See Dobbs, supra note 13, at 383.
424. Id. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 126.
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its insured in making any decision to accept a compromise or settlement
offer." " In making such a decision, the insurer has been charged with
considering its insured's interests as well as its own. Consequently, the
decision to accept a settlement offer has been most critical where the in-
sured was being sued for an amount in excess of the policy limits, while
an offer for settlement may have been made within such limits. Thus, the
dilemma of the insurer has been in determining whether it can choose to
defend litigation, and perhaps exonerate itself, at the risk of exposing
the insured to a personal judgment in excess of policy limits. A failure to
exercise good faith in making such a decision-including good faith
toward defending a count for punitive damages for which it ordinarily
owes the insured no duty426 -may result in the insurer being liable for
any judgment against the insured in excess of the limits of the policy.4 27
Now, under comparative negligence, it appears that the insurer will
be faced with a second conflict of interest problem. The gravamen of the
problem will revolve around counterclaims by defendants. Where on
one hand, failure to settle by the insurer has the potential of costing
the insured money by requiring him to pay a judgment in excess of his
policy limits, on the other hand, settlement by an insurer may now cost
the insured by depriving him of an opportunity to recover a net recovery
(after set-off) on his counterclaim. What is novel, since the advent of
Hoffman, is the situation where a negligent defendant may seriously raise
a counterclaim for his own damages without being barred by his contrib-
utory negligence. With the advent of such counterclaims, and particularly
where the insured counter-plaintiff has substantial damages and an oppor-
tunity for a net recovery (after set-off), it may be that the insurer in
control of the litigation will now be faced with a conflict of interest prob-
lem if it decides to settle. By agreeing to settle, the insurer would gen-
erally deprive the insured of the opportunity for a recovery on his
counterclaim. It may be that where the counter-plaintiff's claim is so
substantial as to warrant these kinds of considerations, the only proper
and fair course of action for the insurer would be to suggest that the in-
sured consult independent counsel before agreeing to let the insurer
settle.4 28
425. See generally 18A FLA. JuR. Insurance § 808 (1971).
426. Ging v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1970).
427. Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938), began a long line
of cases holding to the proposition stated. See also Segal, Duty of a Liability Insurer to Settle
Within Policy Limits-The Problem of Excess Liability, 17 U. MiAmi L. REv. 557 (1963);
Note, Liability Insurer's Duty to Compromise, 14 U. FxA. L. Rxv. 48 (1961); Annot., 40
A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
428. At the least, the insurer would have to show full disclosure, but as in other areas
of law, the courts might be reluctant to find a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of one's
rights absent advice of impartial counsel. The caveat for the courts is not to set a costly
precedent of requiring an insurer to cause its insured to retain independent counsel except
in cases where his counterclaim is truly a meritorious and substantial one.
Another question regarding insurers is the possible conflict due to the effect of set-offs,
discussed in section HI, B, 3, a supra.
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4. INSURANCE RATES
The effect of the comparative negligence doctrine on insurance rates
has interested several commentators as well as the insurance industry.
Although there is a general agreement that rates are not significantly
affected by the doctrine,42 none of the commentators is prepared to say
so with certainty. The primary reason therefore is that insurance rates
are subject to many variables, most of which have a much more volatile
effect than does comparative negligence, and most of which are difficult,
if not impossible, to measure.
Support for the conclusion that comparative negligence has little
or no effect on rates is based on two factors. First, there has been no
observable jump in insurance rates after several jurisdictions (which have
been the subjects of surveys) have adopted the doctrine. 8° Secondly,
there has been, until recently, a general agreement that, upon adoption
of the comparative negligence rule, the frequency of claims increases
whereas the average size of individual claims decreases.431 This theory
has been challenged recently and there are now statistics which indicate
that the frequency of claims will decrease upon adoption of comparative
negligence4 2 But before any conclusion can be drawn from insurance
rates, much more empirical evidence appears to be needed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Comparative negligence complicates the law of negligence, but it
is certainly a more equitable system of loss distribution than the contrib-
utory negligence scheme. Of the several types of comparative negligence,
the pure form is not only the most equitable, but is potentially as simple
to administer as any, especially when designed with sufficient forethought
to avoid the creation of the myriad exceptions which have crept into
so much of the common law.
The effective administration of the doctrine depends on several fac-
tors which, because of its pervasive effect on the law of torts, are not
capable of efficient consideration except in the totality of the system.
Among those steps which must be undertaken in a harmonious pattern
are the abolition of the now obsolete doctrines that distinguish between
429. Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L.
Ray. 689 (1960); Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A 'Before and After'
Survey, 13 ARK. L. REv. 89 (1959); Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence-A Survey of the
Arkansas Experience, 22 ARK. L. REv. 693 (1967); Todd, The Prospect For Insurance Rate
Changes Under Comparative Negligence, 36 TEx. B.J. 1153, 1154 (1973). But see Grubb &
Roper, Comparative Negligence, 32 NaB. L. REv. 234, 246-47 (1952); Note, 43 NOTRa DAMM
LAw. 422 (1968); Note, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 351. Of the above, only Peck and Todd attempt
to present a thorough statistical analysis.
430. See note 429 supra.
431. Id.
432. Todd, The Prospect for Insurance Rate Changes Under Comparative Negligence,
36 T x. B.J. 1153, 1154 (1973).
1974] PURE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 813
different types of negligence, or that afford artificial immunities to certain
parties which would thwart the comparison of their negligence with that
of others. Similarly, the doctrine of joint and several liability, the effec-
tuation of adequate releases so as to promote settlements, and the handling
of insolvent and nonjoinable parties must be simultaneously tackled.
The authors commend the Supreme Court of Florida for having had
the courage to embark on this new common law adventure, and hereby
submit for the consideration of that court, the trial bar and the legislature,
the fruits of what is hoped will be a useful presentation of their thoughts
and research on these subjects.
